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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Electrical energy storage is a key component in many of today’s advanced vehicles.
Lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) offers great energy and power density but also
presents a safety and security risk when used on passenger buses. To assist engineers
and technicians in the process of implementing NCA battery systems in heavy vehicles,
the Penn State research team, with support from MNTRC and research sponsors, tested
large-format NCA cells and modules under several scenarios and explored various
materials and methods to improve passenger and vehicle survivability.
Following a literature review and study of current hybrid electric and/or electric bus
manufacturers’ high-voltage battery design and fabrication methods, the research team
developed a plan to study the results of NCA battery failures at both cell and module levels.
This plan included various stresses applied to cells and modules such as overcharge, shortcircuit, nail puncture, and crash testing. An investigation into packaging materials was also
performed during these tests to help determine the response of a full battery system. The
research team considered all likely system failures and vehicle impact scenarios as well as
other maintenance issues resulting in protection system failure or damage to cell casing.
Initial testing was only commissioned after a detailed safety analysis and after the
development of a series of standard operating procedures, including an analysis of required
personal protective equipment, test procedures, and cleanup practices. This testing is
extremely dangerous and should only be performed by properly prepared experts. The
research team utilized an open-air site within their vehicle testing area and set up a control
center at a distance of several hundred feet to ensure that all personnel on site were always
safe and clear of any flying debris. This control center is capable of starting, stopping, and
recording all sensor data while remote cameras record audio and video of the element
under test.
The first tests were intended to understand how currently used materials handle the worstcase scenario, an overcharge event. Healthy 45Ah NCA cylindrical cells were fully charged,
then introduced to the test site. The first test evaluated the performance of acetal material,
commonly used to package cells in a module. The second test was used to evaluate the
metal materials typically used in battery pack enclosures, a 6061 aluminum alloy and
a low-carbon steel. These fully charged cells were then overcharged, one at a time, at
approximately a C/2 rate or 22.5 A. Cell voltage climbed less than one volt before venting
and also experienced an interesting 0.25 to 0.5 dip in voltage just before the cell vented.
External cell temperatures during this overcharge event slowly climbed until just before the
venting event with the rate increasing to about 10°C per minute. During the venting event,
fire and electrolyte shot out of the cell under test, reaching distances upward of six feet in
two directions and lasting about 10 seconds.
Regardless of the cause, each venting event showed similar results in violent venting of
electrolyte and extreme temperature increases. Most cell exteriors exceeded 600°C and
remained at relatively high temperatures for several hours.
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The results of just about any test using acetal material concluded in the complete failure of
structural support or thermal insulation. Immediately following a venting event, the acetal
material would start burning and in only a few minutes deteriorate to a puddle of liquid,
and then continue to burn until the majority of the material was gone. Any testing using
aluminum in direct contact with venting gases resulted in melting, creating a large opening
ranging from the size of a quarter to about 6 inches, depending on the proximity of the
material to the opening in the cell.
Understanding these results, the team modified the test plans to select a reliable material
to both sustain the heat and flames of a venting event as well as support thermal insulation,
limiting nearby cells from excessive heat exposure. Materials such as Teflon and an
intumescent phase-changing material produced by Pyrophobic showed promise.
Finally, module-level testing and metal materials analysis resulted in the following
conclusions. First, a check valve to release the hot gases of a large-format cell venting,
even if only one cell is venting, is not feasible. Commercially available check valves do
not allow the high flow rate necessary to utilize a check valve. Only large blowout walls
or sections are feasible based on the high flow rate. This led the team down the path of
designing a ducting system to evaluate the electrolyte as quickly and safely as possible
utilizing the dynamics learned in single-cell testing. Also, aluminum alloys are not capable
of sustaining the initial impact of high-pressure venting gases and flames because of the
excessive temperature. Finally, a modular, thin, lightweight steel skin is recommended
to absorb the initial blast of cell venting as well as to direct the gases out of the battery
system. While aluminum can be used as exterior packaging or for the pack level enclosure,
steel must absorb and guide the impact of the gases and direct to a common exit point
large enough to handle a relatively high flow rate such as a blowout panel or ducting to a
safe exterior location.
The team showed, through testing, that it is possible to have all the cells in a 20-cell
module vent and not burn down the entire enclosure if the venting electrolyte gases are
directed properly. If Teflon packaging material is used, the structural integrity will also
remain intact even in the high heat environment, allowing for high survivability rates and
longer evacuation times on passenger buses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This report was written for a broad audience and covers safety and security concerns when
using lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) cell systems; other research regarding
current regulations; and the setup, execution, and results of testing performed by this
research group.
After a presentation of the literature review and introduction to the test setup, the report
primarily covers the various tests performed and results obtained, specifically the cell
and material performance during an overcharge, nail puncture, short circuit, or impact
test. This entailed simulating some of the most likely scenarios to which a passenger bus
battery system would likely be exposed during its service life on the road, while charging,
or during maintenance.
To safely perform these tests, experts were consulted to determine all the necessary
personal-protective equipment, operating distances, preparation, and disposal
procedures. This information was made available to all researchers and support personnel.
It is not recommended that these tests be performed without properly preparing for the
worst-case scenario. Please do not try to repeat these tests without all necessary safety
measures in place.
To safely operate a vehicle with large, onboard electrical energy storage, including hundreds
of cells, a battery management system with a design capable of handling thermal events
for a reasonable amount of time is necessary. Educating the workforce responsible for the
safe and secure design, integration, and maintenance of these high-power/high-energy
systems is necessary for the long-term success of electric and hybrid electric vehicles
using this chemistry. This work strives to support the education effort.
The goal of this report is to expose design engineers and technicians who maintain hybrid
electric or electric-only passenger buses to the dangers of the high power and high energy
of a large-format NCA cell. Many of the groups designing battery systems or working in or
around such systems are not able to perform this level of investigation. To educate them
on the dangers of this chemistry, cells and modules were pushed past their limits and their
responses were studied. The surrounding materials used to package and enclose these
cells are also studied and the results presented.
The researchers present commonly used methods and materials and investigate others
to improve survivability on passenger buses, producing research results that range from
avoiding vehicle fires to extending evacuation time.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The investigators conducted a literature review to evaluate standards, regulations, and
publications; to identify research gaps; and to pursue new innovative safety tests to run on
large-format NCA battery cells and packs that are used in bus transit applications.
This section is divided into three subsections. The first contains information necessary to
gain familiarity with the cells used in this research. The second goes over the regulations
that electrical energy storage manufacturers are facing as well as the problems that
transit authorities and firefighters are confronting due to the increase of electric and hybrid
vehicles on the road. Finally, the third subsection summarizes the set of test scenarios
evaluated by this research group.

CELL INFORMATION
The collection of information started with the cells themselves, including format, chemistry,
and properties that inevitably lead to thermal runaway. However, there are not many studies
available on large-format cells used in transit applications, presumably due to recent
growth in battery technology. Most of the publications are on the smaller-format 18650
cells, which contain much less energy and, as a consequence, exhibit fewer energetic
thermal events.
In addition to reviewing publications, the research group contacted cell manufacturers for
information regarding how to safely operate their batteries and what conditions should be
avoided. According to manufacturers, unsafe conditions occur when any cell is operated
outside of published temperature, voltage, and/or current ranges. If NCA cells experience
one or more of these conditions, they are assumed to be damaged and could possibly enter
thermal runaway. Overcharging one or more cells to the point of failure was determined to
be a feasible default test, since this fits the scope of the project and was safely repeatable
within lab facilities and capabilities. It is also reasonably affordable, and representative of
many likely scenarios on board electric transit buses. This scenario primarily simulates the
failure of a battery management system (BMS) to accurately measure cell voltage and/or
to act on a voltage fault resulting in a cell overcharge.
The data sheet for the cells selected as part of this work, GAIA NCA 45 Ah, provided a
well-defined range of operating conditions for voltage, current, and temperature. Failures
generally occur when a cell is operated outside its manufacture rating. According to
manufacturer’s information, the safe cell voltage range is 2 to 4.2V. This is the primary
safety limitation. The safe range of operating temperatures is strictly defined as -30ºC
to 60ºC. This work will show, however, that thermal/venting events occur even within
this range. As far as the current limitations, values for continuous and peak charge and
discharge are detailed within the attached specification sheet. They range from 270 A
(charge) to 1250 A (discharge) but are condition and state dependent. A full specification
sheet for the large-format cell selected for this research can be found in Appendix A –
Specification Sheets.
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Generally, when cells are overcharged or mechanically damaged, cell failures are followed
by thermal runaway as a result of a cell internal fault, which is one of the most severe
failure conditions for this chemistry.
In general, whenever a charged Li-ion cell is exposed to temperatures above 60°C, there
is a risk of initiating a strong exothermic reaction within the cell. The heat generated by
these reactions will result in a rise in the cell temperature, which in turn activates heat
generation amplitude or additional exothermic reactions that build up pressure in the cell.
The cells used in this research are equipped with a safety/pressure burst disc at each
terminal side rated at 144-200 psi at room temperature. Figure 1 shows a cell that was
overcharged until its burst discs were opened and the cell vented.

Open Burst Disc

Figure 1. Cell after Venting Event
The venting process implies release of flammable electrolyte, generation of gases, or
even rupture of the cell casing. In most cases, all three happen almost simultaneously.
Figure 2 demonstrates the intensity of the venting process, as exhibited by flames and
gases energetically flowing out over approximately five seconds.
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Figure 2. Single Cell Nail Puncture Test
Figure 2 only shows what can happen to one cell, but in heavy buses, battery packs
consist of hundreds of cells wired in a series/parallel configuration. In a high-quantity,
multi-cell pack, such as an electric bus, the venting of just one cell can propagate its
thermal energy to neighboring cells causing a chain reaction until all cells rupture due to
extreme thermal conditions.
GAIA, the manufacturer of the cells used in this testing, shared the following data found in
Figure 3 and Figure 4 through their United States company Lithium Technology Corporation.
Figure 3 presents voltage, current, and temperature from an overcharge test performed by
the cell manufacturer GAIA. As seen in this figure, a fully charged cell (4.2 V at no load)
was continuously charged at 100 A until the battery vented. During the test, the constant
current increased voltage to approximately 5.2 V. This high potential between terminals
and/or other internal phenomena likely caused internal shorts, dropping the cell voltage
to below 5 V. Once internal shorts or other energy-releasing reactions occur, there is an
abrupt increase in the rate of temperature rise.

Min e ta National Tra n s it Re s e a rc h Co n s o rt iu m

Literature Review

7

Figure 3. Data from Manufacturer Overcharge

Overcharge
As a result,Testing
when the Results
cell vented, the temperature in the surrounding environment rose
Gas Analysis
immediately

to 600ºC for a short period of time. Temperature sensors placed on the
485Ahbattery
cell rose to 400-450ºC and remained warm, taking several hours to cool down to
ambient temperature.

Robustness
and Safety

Broad
applications

Figure 4. Molecules Present in Venting Gas
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Figure 4 shows the molecules present in the venting gases by percentage of total volume.
Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, nitrogen and hydrogen are the principal gases released
during venting of the cell. Nitrogen, hydrogen, and carbon dioxide represent minimal
threats to the atmosphere and humans. Carbon monoxide, however, is toxic.

BATTERY FAILURES AND REGULATIONS
The most common failures in automotive battery systems were researched by contacting
car insurance companies and consulting the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
reports. However, significant information was not found, so other publications were
examined to determine the forces batteries experience during a crash event, how to
reproduce them, and what level of hazard they would represent.
During the process of going over the standards and regulations for electric vehicles (EV),
hybrid electric vehicles (HEV), and Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEV), it became
apparent that many associations such as the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE),
National Fire Protective Association (NFPA), and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
(FMVSS) have developed standards. Information is scattered, however, and varies
between associations. The researched information was divided into the following topics:
1. Regulation of electrical energy storage in buses
2. First responder strategies/tactics to respond to EV/HEV/PHEV incidents
3. Commercial battery pack characteristics
4. Fire-suppression systems
5. Electric vehicle crashes

Government Regulations
The authors review here the statistics of the proportion of vehicles involved in traffic
accidents in US. The data is obtained from the 2013 Traffic Safety Facts1 report, which
is an annual compilation of motor vehicle crash data presented by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).2
.
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Figure 5. Proportion of Vehicles Involved in Traffic Crashes in US2
Figure 5 shows that buses are involved in less than 1% of accidents compared to passenger
cars and light trucks, which are the most common vehicles on the road. Figure 6 illustrates
the percentage of bus accident fatalities in 2013 based on the initial point of impact.

Bus occupants dead by initial point of
impact during 2013
3%

4%

Front

14%
9%
8%

Left Side

62%

Right Side
Rear
Noncollision
Other/Unknown

Figure 6. Bus Occupants Dead by Initial Point of Impact2
Figure 6 also indicates that frontal impacts are the worst-case scenario with the highest
percentage of fatalities. In 62% of fatal accidents, the impact came from the front. Lower
fatality rates occur during rear (14%), right-side (9%), and left-side (8%) accidents. In
Figure 7, the same data are presented for injuries, and it is observed that the percentages
are more equally distributed among each side of the vehicle.
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Bus occupants injured by initial point
of impact during 2013
21%

37%

Front
Left Side

21%
21%

Right Side
Rear

Figure 7. Bus Occupants Injured by Initial Point of Impact2
In a frontal crash, the most common mechanisms of injury for passengers seated in a
seat-to-seat configuration are neck flexion or extension. These injuries are due to the
combination of unrestrained passengers and the low back seat designs.3 The Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 207 establishes requirements for seats,
attachment assemblies, and installation, to minimize the possibility of failure as a result
of forces acting on the seat in vehicle impact. The standard FMVSS No. 208 regulates
the “Occupant Crash Protection” to reduce the number of fatalities and the number and
severity of injuries to occupants involved in frontal crashes.
The FMVSS are the requirements issued by the US government to qualify vehicles
before they enter the market to ensure that vehicles on the road are safe. Compliance
with government regulations is analyzed through a set of tests to determine if the vehicle
passes or fails. In addition, there are institutes and associations that provide ratings to give
clients some guidelines about the safety of the vehicle. Associations and institutes such
as the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) have developed different tests and
ratings to be able to measure and report the safety response of the vehicle during a crash.
These associations are well known and respected by consumers.
Figure 8, which was taken from Safety Companion 2016,4 illustrates vehicle safety
regulations and associations by country. Please, notice that the star indicates “association”
while § means “government regulation.”
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Figure 8. Vehicle Standards Around the World5
The U.S. is regulated by the standards under the U.S. FMVSS and several ratings,
including the U.S. New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) and IIHS. Moreover, the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) also applies to US.

UNECE:
The UNECE is the forum in which the countries of Western, Central and Eastern Europe,
Central Asia and North America (56 countries in all) come together to forge the tools of their
economic cooperation. That cooperation concerns economics, statistics, environment,
transport, trade, sustainable energy, timber and habitat.5 The UNECE released the
Proposal for an Electric Vehicle Regulatory Reference Guide, which cites, summarizes,
compares and analyzes regulations from the countries that form the UNECE.

U.S. NCAP:
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s NCAP6 created the 5-Star Safety
Ratings Program to provide consumers with information about crash protection and
rollover safety of new vehicles beyond what is required by Federal law. One star is the
lowest rating; five stars is the highest.
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IIHS:
The IIHS is an independent, nonprofit scientific and educational organization dedicated
to reducing losses, deaths, injuries and property damage from crashes on the nation’s
roads. The Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI) shares and supports this mission through
scientific studies of insurance data representing human and economic losses resulting
from ownership and operation of different types of vehicles and by publishing insurance
loss results by vehicle make and model.7

FMVSS No. 305: SAFETY REQUIRIMENTS FOR ELECTRIC VEHICLES
Scope: Cars, buses, trucks with a GVWR of 4536kg or less that use electrical components
with working voltages higher than 60 volts direct current (VDC) or 30 volts alternating
current (VAC), and whose speed attainable is more than 40km/h.
Requirements:
• Maximum 5 liters of electrolyte may spill from the batteries.
• There shall be no evidence of electrolyte leakage into the passenger compartments.
• All components of the electric energy storage/conversion system must be anchored
to the vehicle.
• No battery system component that is located outside the passenger compartment
shall enter the passenger compartment. Isolations must be greater than or equal to
°° 500 ohms/V for all DC high voltage sources without isolation monitoring and for
all AC high voltage sources.
°° 100 ohms/V for all direct current, high voltage sources with continuous monitoring
of electrical isolation.
• The voltage of the voltage source (Vb, V1, V2) must be less than or equal to 30 VAC
for AC components or 60 VDC for DC components.
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Test conditions:

Figure 9.

FMVSS No. 305 Tests Conditions5

Figure 9 details the test conditions of FMVSS No. 305. According to the scope, it is
assumed that this regulation is not applicable to all kinds of buses. For example, a full-size
bus is around 39,000 lbs., exceeding the weight specified in the scope, so the standard
does not cover all the buses.
Buses must also comply with state regulations. In the case of New York State, there is
the “Bus & Passenger Vehicle Regulations” published by New York State Department
of Transportation that establishes a set of requirements, always according to the US
Department of transportation (DOT).8 These include:
• Vehicle inspection
• Motor vehicle identification and markings
• Vehicle safety requirements
• Vehicles for transporting the disabled
• Electrical systems
• Electric-powered motor vehicles
• Identification of electric vehicles
• Equipment requirements for electric and hybrid-electric buses
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• Batteries and battery compartment
• Electric propulsion circuit
• Range selectors
• Electrical overload protection
• Regenerative braking systems
• Backup alarm
“Batteries and Battery Compartment” specifies a set of requirements for the battery pack
with respect to crash-worthiness including:
• Battery compartment(s) shall be designed and constructed to prevent all battery
fluids, such as gel, liquid electrolytes, caustic, reactive or toxic gases or fumes,
from entering the passenger compartment when a vehicle is subjected to a moving
contoured barrier crash test such that:
a. The contoured barrier shall weigh 4,000 pounds and be configured as specified
in Figure 2 of FMVSS 3019
b. The barrier assembly shall be traveling longitudinally forward at any speed up to
and including 30 mph at the time of impact
c. The barrier assembly may impact the test vehicle at any point and at any angle
Note that that “Batteries and Battery Compartment” refers to FMVSS No. 301 to specify
the characteristics of the barrier. State laws therefore also take into account FMVSS
standards and adapt them.
Furthermore, the Standard Bus Procurement Guidelines (SBPG) 2013 released by
American Public Transit Association (APTA) are a model for solicitation of offers and
contracts for the supply of transit buses and also specify crash requirements.10

Transit Authorities and First Responders
This section addresses how first responders perform their duties in response to accidents
involving battery-powered vehicles. This question is very general and there is no unique
answer. However, firefighters are usually the group in charge and manipulate the vehicle to
rescue victims if necessary. This understanding directed the research group to investigate
procedures for first responders or firefighters to approach battery systems in a bus crash.
Some concerns are ensuring the safety of the responders and accident victims from
potential high voltage and from exposure to dangerous chemicals.
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The investigators reviewed strategies the fire departments adopted for EV and HEV fires
and, as a result, the training fire fighters are receiving. Although they are already trained
to handle conventional vehicles, fire fighters are taught additional procedures by their
department for responding to electric vehicle fires. NFPA published a report that developed
the technical basis for best practices in emergency response procedures for electric-drive
vehicle battery incidents. A major conclusion of the study was that EV fires should be
treated differently from conventional vehicle fires, because more water is required to cool
down the battery completely in EV fires. Usually an additional engine has to act as an
extra water supply since the water is applied for a relatively longer period after the flames
are no longer visible. This is because battery cells may reignite after hours of rest. Unless
the battery pack has been cooled down sufficiently, reigniting is a potential risk. For this
reason, NFPA guidelines also recommended that burned vehicles be kept at least 50 feet
away from any combustible material for some time after the event.
Since battery packs are placed in different locations within the vehicle, NFPA published
a field guide to determine the location of the high-voltage battery within the vehicle and
provide guidance to shut down and disable battery packs and vehicle circuits. NFPA also
concluded that the vehicle structure should not be pierced, cut or dismantled, because the
first responder has the potential to come in contact with high voltage. Current firefighter
personal protective equipment (PPE) does not offer the appropriate level of electrical
protection. Field experiments have shown there is no adverse electrical current at the
nozzle during the firefighting operations.11 However, the NFPA field guide does not provide
post-crash procedures or a checklist for fire departments and traffic associations to perform
after an electric vehicle accident.

Commercial Battery Pack Characteristics
The amount of energy that needs to be stored in an electric bus requires large battery
packs that often cannot be located in one specific place. As a consequence, in many
cases it has to be distributed throughout the vehicle.

Figure 10. Battery Pack on the Roof of the Bus
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The most common locations are the roof and sides. Figure 10, taken from the web site of
Power Vehicle Innovation, shows a battery pack on the roof of a bus.12 Roof mounting is
also used in buses running on gaseous fuels like compressed natural gas or hydrogen to
protect tanks from side impact.

Figure 11. Battery Packs on the Side of the Bus
Alternatively, Figure 11 taken from the web site of the Life of Guangzhou13 shows the
battery packs mounted on the side. In some cases, cooling systems are also rooftop
mounted. The packs also have to be properly enclosed and sealed to avoid any contact
with water and prevent damage to any electronic components.
The researchers expected to find guidelines for commercial battery pack design and
recommended materials for bus side panels in order to replicate them for testing purposes.
The proprietary nature of bus designs, however, made it very difficult to find information
on composites and alloys utilized by the bus industry. Most critically, this investigation
centered on which plastic material should be used for cell holders within the battery pack,
since the material had to have good mechanical, machining, and thermal proprieties at a
reasonable price. Fortunately, the investigators had access to several donated commercial
vehicle battery packs, which were analyzed in order to design a representative battery
pack for testing.

Fire Suppression Systems
According to the NFPA, there is a vehicle fire every two minutes in the United States. With
an increase in the number of electric vehicles on the road, the fire suppression systems
industry and firefighters and traffic associations have to adopt new procedures to overcome
all the challenges posed.
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Electric vehicle incidents require development of new products and materials. The industry
is considering two main options: material that itself possesses fire-suppressive properties,
or a fire suppression system incorporated in or around the battery pack.
No regulation is currently proposed, however, that obligates the addition of fire suppressions
systems to Lithium ion cells or packs. In order to control cost, therefore, most electrical energy
storage manufacturers are not assembling fire suppression systems into their packs.14

Electric Vehicle Crash
Review of battery crash test publications revealed several variants. One consisted of
bolting down the battery pack while a crash device was impacted into the battery pack.
The other variant was completely the opposite: the battery was moved to impact the crash
device. In both variants the vehicle dynamics were neglected.15
In regard to crash velocity, our crash tests were conducted near 20 mph, because the
literature affirmed that to be a common speed limit in urban environments.

DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
The last task was to define a matrix of battery stress tests or destructive test-to-failure
tests that would be within the capability of the research facilities and budget and most
beneficial to the battery/bus designing and maintenance community. The set of tests
was limited by the number of cells, materials, and time to generate pack design and the
stressing mechanisms to which the batteries would be subjected. The test matrix included
both single cells, ten cell modules, and twenty cell modules to represent sections of a full
battery pack found in heavy vehicle systems.
From the literature review, it was understood that during a venting scenario thermal energy
is released in the form of visible flames and smoke. Thermal propagation at the pack level
is a serious problem, since the thermal energy can propagate to neighboring cells. For this
reason, several pack designs were considered to reduce or eliminate thermal propagation
by quickly releasing or absorbing heat from the pack to avoid thermal propagation.
Different enclosure designs were tested including aluminum and steel materials with a
variety of emergency venting designs to release or contain gases using a check valve.
Polyoxymethylene (POM) (commercially known as acetal), Polyethylene terephthalate
(PET), Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) (commercially known as Teflon), and a special
material donated by a research sponsor were the materials selected to be tested. The
batteries were subjected to electrical and mechanical abuse through different tests to
induce thermal runaway. To replicate electrical abuse tests, the group subjected the
batteries to overcharge and nail puncture tests. As a mechanical abuse test, a 20 mph
side impact crash test was performed. The following sections detail each test.
Several primary causes of failure associated with NCA cells have been identified, including
overcharge, puncture, thermal runaway, and both external and internal short circuits. More
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detail on these failure modes will be provided later in the report. Table 1 summarizes the
likely causes, results, countermeasures, test approaches, and likelihood of such events
occurring based on the likelihood of each cause. This table represents a simplified Design
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (DFMEA) for NCA battery systems on buses restricted
to thermal events. Here the authors will briefly focus on the likelihood of each failure
mode. Low likelihoods can normally be assigned to both BMS failure and internal cell
shorting due to manufacturing defects, assuming that design and quality control of both
are sufficient. These likelihoods could become high, however, if defects manage to escape
quality control and test screenings at the factory. Moderate likelihoods should be assigned
to cell puncture, thermal runaway, and external shorting, because they are linked to the
rate of bus crashes, fires from other causes, and the potential for maintenance issues
over the lifespan of a bus, (typically about 12 years). Quality and process control are much
more challenging in these environments outside of a factory floor. Reliable data of battery
failures in the field should become available soon as more and more electric buses are
deployed and begin to age in service.
Table 1.

Likelihood of Cell Events
Test
Approach
(Chapter)

Likelihood

BMS watchdogs,
diagnostics, design,
materials

*BMS and
charger
override
(chapter)

Low
Linked to
electronics
reliability

Cell
rupture,
fire

Pack design, material
and pack location

*Nail press,
*pendulum
impact
(chapter)

Moderate
Linked to crashes
and other accidents

Internal or
external heat
source

Cell
rupture,
fire

Pack design, material
and pack location

*Exposure
to fire
(chapter)

Moderate
Linked to fire and
other heat sources

External
Short Circuit

Insulation loss
from crash,
design,
maintenance

Cell
rupture,
fire

Pack design, material
and maintenance
standards

*Closed
contactor
(chapter)

Moderate
Linked to crashes and
maintenance issues.

Internal Cell
Short Circuit

Manufacturing
defect

Cell
rupture,
fire

Manufacturing quality
control, design, material

Seed defect
(chapter)

Low
Cell quality control

Thermal
Event Cause

Source of
Cause

Likely
Result

Counter Measures
and Mitigation

Overcharge

BMS, charger,
sensor, wiring
failures

Cell
rupture,
fire

Puncture

Crash,
mishandling,
projectile

Immediate
or Delayed
Thermal
Runaway

* Test approaches performed.

Overcharge
As the cell is overcharged, lithium ions are irreversibly removed from the positive electrode
and deposited as lithium metal on the negative electrode. This de-lithiation of the positive
electrode continues as the cell voltage increases during overcharge, until eventually the
lithium ions are completely depleted from the positive electrode. During the overcharge
process, the cell impedance starts to rise, due to an increase in the positive electrode
material resistance. At the same time, the electrolyte within the cell begins to decompose,
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coating the active materials and further contributing to the increase in cell impedance. The
increasing cell impedance results in an increase in resistive losses in the form of thermal
energy. The cell temperature starts to rise rapidly as an exothermic reaction between the
de-lithiated positive electrode material and the electrolyte occurs. Once cell temperature
rises above approximately 60°C, the rate of this reaction accelerates, generating a large
amount of carbon dioxide.
Cell temperature continues to rise until the internal temperature reaches approximately
130–135°C. In this temperature range, the cell separator undergoes a phase transition
that closes the porosity of the membrane and impedes the transport of ions between
the electrodes. This engineered safety feature “shuts down” the separator, terminating
the charge current and ending the overcharge process. In some instances, a “shutdown”
of the separator is unable to stop the self-heating of the cell, which eventually leads to
additional exothermic degradation processes. These additional processes are not well
understood but if sufficiently activated can continue to generate heat within the cell and
can eventually lead to a thermal runaway.16

Nail Puncture
The nail puncture test attempts to simulate a cell internal short circuit condition by using
a nail to achieve a short between the cell’s positive and negative electrodes. A short
between the terminals will generate a very large short-circuit current. Most of this power
will be dissipated in the form of heat in the cell, increasing the temperature of the internal
materials, boiling electrolyte and increasing pressure inside the cell. The pressure will
only reach at most 200 psi, since the burst discs on either terminal of the cell are rated to
handle this pressure. A nail puncture test is a standard and was chosen here to replicate
damage during a crash event. It was also used to intentionally induce an internal short,
dissipating any residual energy. With the purpose of ensuring the cells are safe to handle
for disposal after overcharge or any other non-nail puncture testing.

Simulation of Side Impact at 20 MPH
A large impact pendulum located in LTI’s facilities was used to simulate a 20 mph side
impact. Direct impact of a Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) bumper was simulated at 20 MPH to
replicate the likely scenario of light vehicles crashing into a transit bus on urban streets.
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Figure 12. Safety Discussions Prior to Entering the Test Site
As part of this test, local fire departments and environmental health and safety personnel
were invited as part of a workforce development session. Discussions prior to the testing,
seen in Figure 12, were centered on the test setup and plan. Following the test, emergency
responders acted to suppress the event and educate their firefighters on appropriate
response and approach to actual crash situations.
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III. MATERIAL STUDY
At the system level, batteries are composed of cell separators to hold each battery in
place, and an enclosure to protect the batteries and their BMS components from various
environmental conditions. Typically the cell separators and enclosure are not made of the
same material due to the different properties a designer looks for from each component.
Separators have to be light, be low-cost, have high impedance, and have a high melting
point. A thermoplastic polymer accomplishes all these requirements. The material for the
enclosure will be responsible for absorbing part of the energy in a crash scenario, so it has
to have good mechanical properties, be low in cost, be able to withstand high temperatures,
and be as light as possible (since cells make up most of the weight of a battery pack). In
this case the material can be conductive, because the cells will not be in contact with the
material. Based on these requirements, the ideal material is a metal.

PLASTIC
Acetal is the commercial name of Polyoxymethylene (POM). Graphing all the polymers on
the market, it is clear that a linear relation exists between the melting point and the product
of price and density. Figure 13 (graph created w/ CES EduPack-Granta Design) shows
this relationship between the melting point, cost, and density.

Figure 13. Commercially Available Polymers
In fact, breaking down the product, as seen in Figure 14 (graph created w/ CES EduPackGranta Design), note the close link between price and melting point.
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Figure 14. Melting Point v. Price and v. Density
Thus acetal initially looks like a good candidate. Nevertheless, the tests performed showed
that the flames coming out the battery and its casing temperature after an event were
much higher in temperature than the melting point of acetal (160ºC), so all the acetal melted
and ended up burning until it was gone. Different materials with higher melting points
were therefore selected. Using the same relationship between price times density versus
melting point, the investigators sought the next candidates.
Figure 15 (graph created through CES EduPack-Granta Design) shows materials with a
higher melting point than acetal. There are several choices, but none of them is feasible due
to excessive price or density. Furthermore, the market does not demand these materials in
the thicknesses needed to build the battery systems tested in the research, making it very
difficult to get those specific materials with the thickness needed at an affordable price.

Figure 15. Melting Points Above Acetal
Being more restrictive with the product density x price parameter, Polyphenylene
sulfide (PPS) shows up as a possible contender. Again, however, it was hard to find a
provider that supplied the thickness needed. Perusing candidates from the same area,
Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) then appears, a material often used in the industry because
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of its favorable qualities: electrical insulation, inherent flame-resistance, low coefficient of
friction and high melting point (338.89ºC).
The fact that Teflon (PTFE) is inherently flame-resistant makes this material very interesting
for the worst-case scenario conditions that this research will test. It is expected that this
material should not act as a combustible, potentially reducing the length of heat generation
and smoke production during an event. Preliminary testing was performed to investigate
the real-world performance of some commonly used materials. More detailed tests and
test setups are discussed later in this report. Figure 16 shows the results of a single-cell
test when acetal was used to hold the cell. The material continued to burn well after the
cell vented, producing smoke for approximately 30 minutes after the event and concluding
in a complete lack of structural support, mechanical separation, or electrical isolation.

Figure 16. Results of a Single-Cell Acetal Test
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Figure 17. Narrowed Material Search
Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET), as seen in Figure 17 (graph created through CES
EduPack-Granta Design) is also selected based on its high melting point relative to acetal.
It also has a better price/density relationship than the acetal.

Figure 18. Mechanical Properties of POM

Min e ta National Tra n s it Re s e a rc h Co n s o rt iu m

Material Study

25

Figure 19. Mechanical Properties of PET
As seen in Figure 18 and Figure 19, PET has acceptable mechanical properties for cell
separation and structural support as well as similar machining properties to acetal. Another
proprietary plastic material manufactured by Pyrophobic Systems was also experimentally
analyzed during this work. The results of all materials are presented in each of the test
sections to follow.

METAL
Battery packs made for transit-bus applications are typically enclosed in a thin sheeting of
plastic, composite, steel or aluminum. There has not yet been a mass acceptance of any
one material. This section addresses the question of why special considerations should be
made for the material selection of the enclosure material.
First, the objective of this material is to possibly supply structural support, if necessary.
It should otherwise at least limit smoke, heat or other materials from leaving the battery
system in the event of a cell thermal run away. Second, this material needs to be capable
of withstanding the environment, as most battery systems on passenger buses are located
outside the cabin and exposed to moisture and debris. Finally, the material shouldn’t melt
down during a battery thermal event or other fire on board the vehicle.
A preliminary test was performed to evaluate the thermal performance of metals by
positioning a sheet of common 6061 aluminum alloy and mild steel at either end of a
cell undergoing an overcharge. As Figure 20 shows, the flames that came out from the
cell during the venting event melted the aluminum. This proves that the flames/gases
are hotter than the melting point of the aluminum, which is approximately 600ºC. On the
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other hand, the steel plate was able to withstand the hot gases and remain intact. A mark,
indicated by a red circle, where the gases met the steel can also be seen on the far side
of the cell in Figure 20.

Figure 20. Results from a Metal Test
This test validated the use of a relatively thin, 1/8” thick, mild steel with approximate melting
point of 1300ºC when considering materials for exposure to direct venting. For a ducting
system or isolation within a pack, steel is recommended. For small packs with no isolation,
steel should also be used to contain the event for as long as possible, giving passengers
time to evacuate the bus. Otherwise, materials such as aluminum or even plastic will
allow the hot gases to escape immediately and potentially cause more fire damage at a
faster rate, thus making evacuation much harder for passengers and allowing less time to
exit safely. Also, less time would be available for first responders to contain the event by
cooling the pack with water.
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IV. TESTING PREPARATION
UNDERSTANDING CELL CONSTRUCTION
To prepare for this destructive battery testing, an investigation into the particular cell
construction and internal configurations was performed.

Figure 21. Cell Internals – Negative Terminal Disassembled
To understand the mechanisms inside a cell, the research team, partnered with
Pennsylvania College of Technology, safely discharged and disassembled a cell. Figure
21 shows the negative terminal of the GAIA cell and inside view of the pressure release
and electrical isolators.

MACHINING
All machining was performed by students and faculty supported on the project. This
section details the work performed to prepare for the various battery system destructive
tests presented in this report.
During fabrication of battery pack parts, several processes and machining techniques
were used. Cell separators were machined using a Computer Numerical Control (CNC)
mill; covers and enclosure parts were cut using a water jet; and finally enclosure parts were
welded together using Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) welding. These are processes commonly
used in building prototype battery systems and typically available to those designing and
building these systems for low-volume transit buses.
To speed series production and at the same time get accurate dimensions, CNC
technology was used to machine the complicated cell separators. Programming for CNC
machining was done using MasterCAM software. Figure 22 shows the cut profile as
planned prior to machining.
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Figure 22. Machining Preparation
An aluminum plate was used below the cell separator so that through-holes could be
machined without bottoming out onto the end mill table. Figure 23 shows the aluminum
plate and preparations made on the machines prior to any cutting steps.

Figure 23. Material Hold-Down for Separator Machining
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Figure 24 and Figure 25 show some of the intermediate phases in the machine process
while Figure 26 represents the final completed part.
The same steps were followed for all three materials selected for testing. Figure 27 shows
the PET material during separator machining. Figure 28 shows a researcher preparing
a battery enclosure for module testing while Figure 29 shows the completely machined
internal module assembly: top and bottom cell separators and isolation walls.
The parts machined as part of this research were consumed by the battery-destructive
testing presented in other sections of this report.

Figure 24. Cell Pockets

Figure 25. Facing Step

Figure 26. Completed Separator

Figure 27. PET Machining
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Figure 29. Complete Assembly

DATA ACQUISITION SETUP
Data from voltage, current, temperature, and pressure sensors are vital to understanding
the processes a cell undergoes during a destructive test. To gather all this information at
a high rate and over long distances, a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus was setup. All
sensors were tied to the CAN bus via custom-built embedded devices including necessary
signal conditioning and calibration. Each message broadcast from a CAN node was logged
using Vector CANtech hardware and software to monitor and capture the data in real time.
This data allowed researchers to quantify batteries’ response under extreme conditions of
voltage, current, temperature, and (in some cases) pressure.
Figure 30 shows a typical CAN interface setup that logged data from the cells during a
test that in this case included voltage, current, and temperature. Notice that the screen is
split into three main windows. The window on the top left graphs the temperature of each
sensor versus the test time. The window on the bottom left graphs the voltage and the
current. In the case of this nail puncture test, no current is flowing; therefore, the current
value is zero. The window on the right displays raw data variables and current values
available on the CAN network which are available for graphing.
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Figure 30. Monitoring the Data through Vector CANoe
After a test, data was post-processed and exported into a MATLAB format to clean up
erroneous signals and apply any necessary scaling. Because of the various bus speeds
and conflicting CAN IDs, several channels were required to record all test data.
Table 2.

Data CAN Bus Channels

Channel

Bus Speed

1

500 kbps

Equipment
Current sensor (CAB300)

1

500 kbps

Temperature sensor (18B20 and Thermocouples)

2

250 kbps

Pressure sensor (Honeywell MLH150PGB06A)

2

250 kbps

Voltage

Table 2 lists the channels and the bus speeds for each signal. A LEM CAB 300 current
sensor was used to measure current with high resolution and accuracy. This current sensor
is the same type used in battery monitoring applications where high accuracy and very low
offset are required. By collecting accurate current and voltage data during testing, it was
possible to integrate the amount of energy each battery consumed during a test.
Thermocouples and single wire digital sensors were placed in various locations along
both the cell and packaging materials. In early testing, 18B20 digital temperature sensors
were employed, but these have a limited temperature range of -55˚C to 125˚C. The 18B20
sensor communicated directly with a single board microprocessor system via a digital
I/O port, and this system relayed signals with a built-in CAN node. These sensors were
destroyed once the cell vented, and data afterwards could not be recorded. The second
type of temperature sensor used was a J-type thermocouple connected to a CAN-based
scanner from Axiomatic. J-type thermocouples were used for the majority of the testing,
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except for the instrumented nail test for which K-type thermocouples were needed to
measure higher temperature values.
Table 3.

Thermocouple Ranges

Table 3 summarizes the temperature ranges for various thermocouples.
There is no guarantee that our sensors are always reading accurately from test to test, so
the research team built, replaced and tested just about every temperature sensor between
each test to ensure the most accurate data.
Cell voltage measurements were obtained in three different ways:
1. Single cell level: single board computer A/D with CAN conversion and node
2. Pack level: I+ME BMS with CAN node
3. Pack level: single board computer A/D with CAN conversion and node
First Setup
The first setup measured cell voltage analog signal at terminals with single board A/D.
Values were converted to CAN format and broadcast to the network using a CAN chip
add-on board. Calibration was checked using a factory-calibrated multi-meter.
Second Setup
The second setup was used when the test required 10 cell voltages or more in a battery
pack. An I+ME BMS system employed a master/slave communication network. Each
slave reported up to 10 voltages back to the master using an RS485 bus. Two slaves were
used to collect 20 voltages in our final tests. The Master unit sent out the reported voltage
measurements over CAN for logging/monitoring by the Vector CANoe setup.

Min e ta National Tra n s it Re s e a rc h Co n s o rt iu m

Testing Preparation

33

Third Setup
The third setup was necessary because the I+ME BMS hardware is limited to 4.5V per
channel/cell and is inadequate for pack-overcharge tests. The team therefore developed its
own switching and isolation circuitry to measure each module cell’s voltage independently,
sending one cell voltage at a time to a Single Board Computer (SBC) for A/D input.

Figure 31. Arduino-Based Isolated Voltage Measurement PCB
The custom Arduino-Based board, seen in Figure 31, allowed for high-voltage isolation
and scalable voltage dividers so that peak voltages during overcharge could be captured.
The SBC with isolate voltage measurement Printed Circuit Board (PCB) converted data
to CAN messages for network broadcast, and these messages were captured by CANoe.
Calibration of this device was completed prior to each test.
A pressure sensor was used, when sealed packs were tested, to record how pressure
changed inside a battery enclosure before and during an overcharge event. A voltage output
single was read by SBC A/D and broadcast via the high speed CAN bus, similar to all other
sensors. A curve fit calibration was performed to ascertain pressures prior to any testing.
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V. SINGLE-CELL TESTING
Before larger, module-level tests were performed, simpler single-cell testing was needed to
provide baseline data such as temperatures and material responses. This section details
the testing procedures and results of all single-cell tests performed on the GAIA 45Ah NCA
cell. Prior to all tests, cell capacity was verified to be within 80% of its original manufacture
specification, as all the used cells in these experiments were donated with unknown State
of Health (SOH).

SINGLE-CELL TESTING DESIGN
A set of single-cell tests were planned prior to module-level testing to allow for any
information learned to be used in module designs. These tests were used to determine
the response of the batteries in accordance with the failure mode to which they were
submitted and also to discover the performance of the materials tested.
These goals had to be accomplished without compromising safety. This meant the test
setup had to be able to secure the cell during venting processes generating unknown
forces. Strong battery tie-downs were used in early testing. Throughout early testing,
experience was gained which fed directly into future designs of the single-cell test setup.
The first design was a control. The intent was to overcharge a cell to understand the
duration of the venting process and the magnitude of the resulting forces to ensure all
tests could be performed safely.
Two acetal separators and a base were used to hold the cell. Then two metal straps were
also installed to make sure the cell could not escape the test stand. These separators
were either bolted down to the platform of an air press or bolted directly to studs in a
concrete base.
The majority of the single-cell tests were performed on an air press, which gave the
researchers the ability to push a nail through the cell and release the cell energy in the
cases where the initial test failed. This made approaching the cell after a test much safer, as
researchers could be confident there was no residual energy remaining. Also, researchers
could see the energy escape via a severe venting event.
Figure 32 shows a solid model of the early concept for a single-cell test stand.
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Figure 32. Initial Single-Cell Test Stand Design
The results of initial testing showed that the acetal parts used to hold the cell were strong
enough, but shortly after an event they melted and burned until there was little material
remaining.

Figure 33. Cell Enclosure
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Following the initial testing, a cover was designed to enclose a cell and allow for thermal
propagation testing. Figure 33 shows the cell enclosure. This enclosure was slightly larger
than the cell and was secured to the testing platform using the same methodology as the
previous test stand. Figure 34 shows a top-down view of the inside of this cell enclosure.
Note the minimal clearances to minimize any gas pressure relief.

Figure 34. Top-Down View of Cell Enclosure

Holding Cells Down
To be sure that a cell would not escape during a venting or nail puncture test, metal bands
(seen in Figure 35) were used to secure the cell.
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Figure 35. Metal Straps

Air Press
A Mead AP-122 air press was purchased to be able to perform nail punctures and end all
other cell tests safely. The base of the air press was threaded to secure the plastic base
of the single cell platform using through bolts.
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Figure 36. Nail Puncture Air Press
Figure 36 shows the air press system Computer Aided Design (CAD) model including
a cell and nail. The air press was bolted to a concrete pad and was operated through a
system of valves with air pressure supplied by a typical tool compressor.

ACETAL – OVERCHARGE
In this first test, a 20-Ampere (A) load was applied in an overcharge scenario to replicate
a hypothetical undetected voltage measurement error during a constant-current charge
mode. If a BMS (specifically its analog-to-digital converter measuring cell voltage) is not
accurate, a dangerous charge load may remain active. More intelligent charging systems
may measure energy to protect against this, but it is a difficult task to balance the accuracy
of an energy measurement; possible human error in the programming and setup of this
feature; hardware failure; and the assurance that a battery is fully charged. Despite the
attention given to this topic, overcharging of cells continues to occur.
Prior to testing, a single cell was fully charged to 100% State of Charge SOC and/or an open
circuit voltage of 4.2 V as specified by the manufacturer. Upon initial electrical loading,
the cell entered an overcharged state because it was already fully charged. The cell was
allowed to continue charging at a constant current of 20 A until cell pressure discs burst.
Immediately following the pressure release, charge current reduced to nothing due to the
cell becoming an open circuit, likely because of internal damage to electrodes. All the data
and setup of this test are presented in this section.
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The single-cell acetal test stand was bolted to a large concrete pad with metal straps as
previously described. Figure 37 shows the concrete pad and single-cell test stand, with
charge cables, prior to the start of the first overcharge event.

Figure 37. Single-Cell Overcharge Test
Data was collected during testing, including seven temperature sensors attached to various
areas on the surface of the cell, voltage measured between positive and negative terminals
of the cell, and current. All this information was gathered by sensors and broadcasted via
the CAN while simultaneously being logged by a CAN bus data logger, as discussed in the
data acquisition section of this report. Besides recording CAN data, the investigators also
recorded video of the test with two stationary high-resolution cameras.
Maxwell DS1820 single-wire digital temperature sensors were used to capture temperature
data during this test. It was not until after this test that it was discovered that these sensors
would be insufficient due to their range from -55ºC to 125ºC. As a consequence, the
sensors were damaged and peak temperatures achieved during venting were not captured.
However, the temperatures leading up to this venting event were recorded as they were
within range of the sensors.
Figure 38 shows the data recorded via the CAN bus. Cell voltage, temperatures, and cell

current until the venting event were logged.
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Figure 38. Data from Initial Overcharge Test
Note the dip in voltage (top chart) just prior to the venting event. This is a pattern that was
repeatedly observed through all tests and that the research team is confident indicates
the onset of thermal runaway, due to the correlation between dip in voltage and the sharp
increase in temperature rate. As the voltage dips and temperatures rates increase, the
cell experiences an increase in internal pressure right up until the cells’ burst discs break
open and the cell vents. At this point the cell becomes an open circuit and current stops
flowing. Due to internal damage, the electrodes are no longer connected. Note that the
temperatures seen on the external surfaces of the cell (middle chart) never exceed 60ºC
before venting. These particular cells are rated to operate up to 60ºC, so a BMS that uses
temperature data would not have triggered a fault condition since the battery is operating
within specifications. Note that a potential solution to this problem would be modeling
internal cell temperature based on surface and ambient temperature readings as well as
current throughput over a recent time period.
The battery venting lasted roughly five seconds as indicated by flames and huge clouds of
smoke. The magnitude of the event is displayed in Figure 39.
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Figure 39. Venting Cell – First Test
The single cell was held down to the concrete test pad through an acetal cell holder and
plate. The flames and high temperature associated with the venting ignited the acetal
plastic, which acted as a combustible and burned out until it was completely gone, as seen
in Figure 40.
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Figure 40. Cell, Hours After Venting Event
The cell is also visibly swollen after this test. It is clear to the researchers that if not for
its large stainless steel cell casing, the cell’s casing itself would also likely be completely
destroyed. Note that the cell’s threaded terminals and terminal nuts are intact following
this test. The cell burst discs broke as the design intended, with the casing ends bulged
outward slightly.

ACETAL – NAIL PUNCTURE
Based on the previous test of an overcharge, it was important to transition to initiating an
internal short circuit on the cell to simulate a crash event with battery system penetration.
This early test also served a dual role in testing battery enclosure materials by testing their
thermal capabilities and the appropriate thickness of material needed to withstand a direct
venting event. As a starting point, sheets of 1/8-inch-thick aluminum alloy (6061) and a
general low-carbon steel material were used.
This test also marked the initial use of the air press system designed to press a nail through
a cell. For this particular test, only temperature was recorded, and Type J thermocouples
were used. These sensors were located in various areas through the surface of the cell
including the top of the cell by the positive terminal; the positive terminal; the negative
terminal; the top of the cell in the center; the top of the cell by the negative terminal; the
surrounding air (ambient); the aluminum sheet by the negative terminal; the steel sheet by
the positive terminal; and the aluminum base.

Min e ta National Tra n s it Re s e a rc h Co n s o rt iu m

Single-Cell Testing

43

Figure 41 shows cell temperature measurements in two charts. The top is scaled to the
highest temperatures while the bottom is scaled to the lower values. The highest values
were measured on the top of the cell by the positive and negative terminals, peaking at
about 273 ºC and 175 ºC respectively. The bottom chart shows little rise in temperature.
Note that this test was performed in -3 ºC ambient conditions.

Figure 41. Acetal Nail Puncture – Cell Temperatures
Temperature data was also gathered from the surfaces of the aluminum and steel sheets.
These sensors are on the opposite side of that which took the direct blast from the cell
through the vent discs. The maximum material temperature was measured to be 32.7ºC.
Note that these sensors were not directly opposing the point of impact, but instead a few
inches away. Material temperatures did not exceed their respective melting points and did
not exceed 12ºC.

ACETAL – OVERCHARGE AND MATERIAL TEST
The nail puncture testing causing a dramatic internal short circuit did not provide the heat
necessary to melt nearby metals. The objective of this test, therefore, was to determine
if an overcharge would melt the aluminum or steel used to deflect and/or redirect the
venting, burning electrolyte. An overcharge event is likely to release much more energy
than a nail puncture at 100% SOC. As in the previous test, aluminum and steel were
placed on either side of the cells, normal to the pressure release discs, in direct line
with the venting gases. These sheets of material were placed at 1.5 inches from the cell
terminal (approximately where they would be in a pack design for a large bus application
to direct venting electrolyte away from other cells).
Figure 42 shows the setup of the cell and blast shield material. Two acetal separators that
were bolted down on an aluminum base held the cell. The aluminum base was mounted on
the air press, and the blast shield sheets were attached to the base through L type brackets.
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Figure 42. Acetal Overcharge with Blast Shield Material Test Setup
Temperature sensor location was identical to previous tests. As before, only temperature
data was logged during this test. These temperature readings are presented through the
next few charts. Figure 43 shows two charts with the same data but at different time
scales. The top chart shows the entire test from the start, through the venting event, and
until the end of the cells’ cool-down. The bottom chart highlights the temperature profile
immediately following the event.

Figure 43. Acetal Overcharge w/ Material – Cell Temperatures
Note the spikes in temperature: some sensors reach in excess of 600ºC, then are followed
immediately by an aggressive cool-down. The second climb in temperature and sustained
300ºC readings are from the combustion of the cell holders made of acetal material.
If acetal did not burn, then the time during this event in which temperatures exceeded
common vehicle material combustion temperatures would be greatly reduced. This in turn
would reduce the chance of a vehicle fire, or at least limit the damage and increase time
to evacuate and for emergency responders to cool the pack with water.
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The response of the metal is summarized in Figure 44. The first noteworthy point is that
the metal’s temperature exceeds temperature measurements from the cell itself. This is
likely a result of the metal blast shields being in direct contact with the venting gases
while the cell surface temperature sensors are likely limited by the insulation properties of
the cell casing. These material temperatures are assumed to be much closer to internal
cell temperatures than the surface measurements captured from the cell’s exterior. The
aluminum sheet experiences a temperature 100ºC warmer than the steel sheet. One of
the causes of this response could be that the cell did not vent uniformly. Also, the thermal
distribution proprieties of each material are substantially different. If the sensors were
directly on the opposite side of the impact area, more accurate readings would be possible.
In reality, the sensors were at different distances from the impact point of the gases, which
also contributed to this difference.

Figure 44. Acetal Overcharge w/ Material – Material Temperatures
According to the measured temperatures and melting point of the aluminum and steel, it
is not surprising that a two-inch diameter hole was burned through the aluminum while the
steel remained intact.
The venting process for this test was very intense, as Figure 45 demonstrates. Although the
testing was completed in non-ideal environmental conditions (very cold, windy weather),
it did unexpectedly provide a valuable measurement. The black smoke escaping the cell
stained the snow, providing a radius for measuring the effective distance debris can be
expected to travel. Upon visual inspection, the smoke and flames traveled approximately
125 inches from each side of the cell, or in a radius of the same dimension.
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Figure 45. Acetal – Overcharge with Material Test
This test resulted in valuable information useful in understanding the magnitude of
temperature and burning electrolyte that a single 45Ah NCA cell is capable of releasing.
The finding raises concerns of safety and security when using this type of energy storage
system, as well as reason to have redundant sensors to ensure accurate measurements
during charging.

PYROPHOBIC – OVERCHARGE
Part of this research was to investigate fire suppression systems and fire prevention
techniques using new materials and design. Pyrophobic Systems produces proprietary
compounds that claim to both absorb fires and suppress them from spreading to adjacent
areas. This research team formed a partnership with Pyrophobic by receiving donations
of their materials in the form of machined components ready for testing in our single-cell
scenarios. To thoroughly test this material an overcharge test was commissioned. It is well
known from previous tests that the most stressful scenario will occur from an overchargeventing event. For this test the cell was surrounded by a wall of Pyrophobic material with
cell separators holding the cell at each terminal. Again the assembly was bolted down to
an aluminum base that was also secured down to the air press just in case the cell failed
to vent and a nail had to be put through to induce the discharge.
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Figure 46. Pyrophobic – Overcharge Setup
Temperatures of the walls and cell surface were recorded as well as cell voltage and
current. Unfortunately, a sensor placed on the cell and another one on the walls were
lost due to the intensity of the event, so their data is not available. Other than these two
sensors, all others were valid throughout the test. The data gathered from these sensors
can be seen in Figure 47.

Figure 47. Pyrophobic – Overcharge Data
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Analyzing the voltage (top chart), notice that the cell was charged before starting the test
and at an open circuit voltage of 4.2. Although current is not shown in the data charts,
the cell was charged at the typical 20 A constant current which brought the cell up to
approximately 5.4 V just prior to the typical voltage dip. This dip is followed by the increase
in temperature rise, then concludes in a powerful overcharge venting event.
It is notable that the venting event resulted in a peak cell surface temperature of
approximately 400ºC, which is considerably lower than in the earlier tests.

Figure 48. Pyrophobic – Overcharge Results
This test resulted in confirming this material as a viable candidate for use with NCA cells
(see Figure 48.) It is able to maintain structural integrity and not melt or burn during or
following an extreme cell-venting event.

PYROPHOBIC – NAIL PUNCTURE
The test detailed in this section is the evaluation of the Pyrophobic brand intumescent
thermoplastic material under a nail puncture scenario. Temperature sensors were placed
on the cell surface as in previous tests, as well as on all six parts of the cell and wall
separators used in this design. To capture the thermal distribution during an event, but
also to document how well this material held up to this extreme temperature and force,
the temperature sensors were distributed along the cell and the surrounding walls, all
made of the same Pyrophobic material. Figure 49 shows the voltage and temperature data
recorded during this test.
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Figure 49. Pyrophobic – Nail Puncture Data
The top chart shows cell voltage readings; the middle chart cell surface temperature
readings; and the bottom chart Pyrophobic material temperature readings. The cell had
a steady open circuit, unloaded, voltage of 4.1 VDC up until the nail went through to
force the cell into an extreme short circuit condition. As typically seen in these tests, this
led to an internal open circuit dropping the measured voltage to 0 VDC. Temperature
readings from this test are comparable to the previous acetal tests but without the second
jump in temperature due to burning materials. Cell surface temperatures rose quickly to
approximately 300ºC, then slowly cooled back down to ambient over a 1.5-hour period.
The negative terminal wall heated up as soon as the nail went through the cell. This sensor
achieved a peak temperature of 162.8ºC, which is significantly lower than the heat released
by the cell. This fact highlights the excellent capabilities of the material to dissipate heat. A
sensor on the top of the wall took a bit longer to heat up, although it quickly achieved the
same temperature as the wall by the negative terminal.
Another notable result was the measurable difference between positive and negative
terminals. It seemed that the majority of the heat during this test came from the negative
terminal of the cell, so it was no surprise that this side of the material showed more damage.
Figure 50 shows both the positive (left) and negative (right) terminal walls/covers. This
material, just as with the aluminum and steel blast shields, was in the direct path of the
venting, burning, electrolyte released during a nail puncture. As presented above, the
positive terminal experienced a lower temperature rise compared to the negative terminal.
The images of these terminal covers may show why this happened. Venting gases quickly
punctured the positive terminal cover, while the negative cover seems to have contained
these hot gases and only vented on the side opening of the cell separator.

Min e ta National Tra n s it Re s e a rc h Co n s o rt iu m

Single-Cell Testing

50

Figure 50. Pyrophobic Material Results
Following a long cool-down period, all the material including each cover and wall plate was
removed and analyzed.

Figure 51. Pyrophobic Material After Nail Puncture
Figure 51 shows all the parts used to contain this cell nail puncture event. The material
has obviously grown in thickness, yet it clearly hasn’t lost integrity. It would likely keep
this event from impinging into another area, limiting thermal propagation and maintaining
structural integrity.
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PYROPHOBIC – OVERCHARGE WITH HOUSING
Based on the previous test results for the Pyrophobic material, the manufacturer
recommended compliantly enclosing their product to take full advantage of the intumescent
functionality. In hopes of absorbing even more energy, an aluminum housing surrounded
the Pyrophobic material and cell to simulate an enclosed battery system. The metal
enclosure was made out of aluminum 6061 alloy and welded together to create a sealed
enclosure. It was not completely closed, however, as it had openings on the sides by the
terminals to release the smoke and the flames, thus limiting the pressure buildup inside
the enclosure to prevent an explosion.
The housing was bolted down on the same aluminum base that held all previous assemblies
on the air press as seen in Figure 52.

Figure 52. Pyrophobic – Overcharge with Enclosure Setup
The cell was then overcharged as in previous tests. The results are presented in Figure
53. This test started prior to a complete charge. Instead of fully charging, resting, then
resuming in an overcharge state, the test started at approximately 50% SOC. This was a
mistake on the part of the researchers performing the test but resulted in an overcharge
venting event nonetheless. The typical voltage dip at the start of thermal runaway
occurred, but the peak voltage prior to venting was much higher than usual at 8.1 VDC.
It is also notable that the surface temperatures of the cells reached 100ºC right before
the cell vented. This is substantially higher than typical tests, and was probably because
of the insulation effect the aluminum enclosure had on the cell and its surface-mounted
temperature sensors. Despite having higher values of voltage and temperature relative to
other tests, the cell did not get extremely hot during the venting event or thereafter. All the
temperatures except the one on the top of the cell by the center remained between 400500ºC, which is a lower range than typical. The temperature measurements remained in
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this range for approximately 10 minutes, at which point the cool-down process started. It
took around 1.5 hours to cool down to ambient temperatures, which was about average.
During the cooling-down process, the temperatures captured by each sensor placed on
the cell were similar and constituted a very homogenous profile, although after the venting
the material caught on fire.

Figure 53. Pyrophobic – Overcharge with Enclosure Data
Figure 54 shows the machined opening, the larger diameter hole, and the smaller opening
cut by the venting gases.
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Figure 54. Pyrophobic Enclosure Vent Opening
Figure 55 shows the results of using the Pyrophobic materal inside the enclosure. Clearly
this material is more charred and not as strong or capable of holding a cell as that in the
test perfomed without an enclosure.
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Figure 55. Pyrophobic Overcharge with Enclosure Material Results
This test shows the aptitude of Pyrophobic material to absorb substantial amounts of
energy, a desirable trait when selecting a material for battery pack designs. However, it
must be noted that the material cannot be used to both absorb energy and maintain
structrual integrity.

PET – OVERCHARGE
The thermal response of a PET material used in a single-cell test stand was also evaluated.
This section details the setup and results of an overcharge event using PET to both hold
and enclose a single cell. Figure 56 shows the setup for this test. As with previous tests,
the cell is securely mounted to the air press and equipped with temperature, voltage and
current sensors.
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Figure 56. PET – Overcharge Setup
Extreme temperatures were reached during the PET overcharge test, peaking at
approximately 750ºC. Figure 57 shows the current, voltage and temperature data recorded
during this test. Note that typical current and voltage profiles were seen. Leading up to the
vent, a dip in voltages occurred just as temperatures increased to thermal runaway values.
An open circuit was realized when the cell began to vent.

Figure 57. PET – Overcharge Data

Min e ta National Tra n s it Re s e a rc h Co n s o rt iu m

Single-Cell Testing

56

Figure 58 shows the temperature data leading up to the venting event. Note the exponential
rise in temperature starting around the 110-minute mark, just around the same time as the
typical voltage dip.

Figure 58. PET – Overcharge Temperature Data
Not all tests result in exactly the same temperature measurement distribution. Some show
that the positive terminal is hotter than the negative. In this test, however, because the
PET material caught fire (as seen in Figure 59) most sensors detected extremely high and
sustained values.

Figure 59. PET – Material Result
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In this test, after the violent venting that included flames, the material kept burning until
completely gone. In fact, playing back the video recorded during the test, it took around ten
minutes to burn the entire cell enclosure down to nothing. After that the enclosure cooled
down very quickly, because it basically disappeared after ten minutes and sensors then
read ambient temperature. This fire surrounded the cell, heating it. As a consequence, the
cell did not cool down as rapidly as the PET enclosure.
Figure 60 shows the remains after the PET enclosure melted down. The only part not
damaged was the base, which was made of a substantially thicker, 0.5-inch plate.

Figure 60. PET – Material Result 2
The conclusions of this test are that the PET material is not capable of handling the
temperatures, containing the event or remaining structurally intact.

PET – NAIL PUNCTURE
Given the poor material results of the PET during and following its overcharge test,
expectations were low for a nail puncture test using the same material.
Voltage and temperature data were gathered during this test. Figure 61 shows the logged
data.
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Figure 61. PET – Nail Puncture Data
The top voltage chart indicates that the cell was at an open circuit of four VDC prior to the
test. The voltage of the cell stayed stationary until it dropped due to the nail penetrating.
The nail caused a short between the positive and the negative electrodes, resulting in the
typical cell temperature rise and ultimate fierce venting event.
Analyzing the response of the cell, notice that the positive terminal temperature climbed
right after the nail went through the cell. It then remained fairly stationary while the other
sensors responded slightly more slowly.
All the sensors except one on the top of the cell by the negative terminal achieved a
maximum value between 500ºC and 600ºC and remained there for roughly five minutes
until the cool-down process started.
In a review of the recorded video, some notable points stand out. The positive terminal was
the first to reach the high temperatures recorded and was also the first side to experience
a disc rupture, resulting in hot gases venting and flame. This can be seen in Figure 62.
Note that the right side represents the positive terminal.
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Figure 62. PET – Positive Venting First
As with the previous PET tests, the material caught fire and burned until completely gone.
The fire lasted about ten minutes, which according to the graph corresponded to the period
of time between the 15th and 25th minute, when the cooling down profile started. The fire
a few minutes after the nail puncture can be seen in Figure 63.

Figure 63. PET – Nail Puncture Material Result
The flames of the venting ignited the material by the terminals, and the fire then propagated
throughout the entire enclosure. Figure 64 shows that the enclosure was nonexistent after
a few minutes and only the cell case and plastic base remained.
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Figure 64. PET – Nail Puncture Results 2
The results of this test were similar to that of the other PET/acetal tests. The material is not
capable of handling a thermal event from a large-format 45 Ah NCA cell.

TEFLON – OVERCHARGE
Two Teflon overcharge tests were performed, because the first was not successful. Several
tests had to be repeated for various reasons, but the results of this failure were rather
interesting and are presented here as they provide valuable insight into the possibility of
a failed burst disc.

First Test – End Cap Failure
As with all other tests, a fully charged 45 Ah cell was installed into a test stand made of
the candidate material in an overcharge event. The first attempt at a Teflon test resulted in
a structural failure because the entire cell end-cap burst instead of the burst disc. Shortly
after the venting event started, the end-cap came off and the force of the venting gases
projected the cap about seven meters from the test site. Cell casings are made by welding
end-caps to each end of a stainless steel tube. This weld failed and as a result ejected
a substantial amount of electrode material. Figure 65 shows how far this material spread
from the test site.
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7 meters
Figure 65. Blast Radius
The cell also ejected from the base and would have likely gone a great distance but hit a
pile of snow, limiting its travel. This event gave the researchers an even greater respect
for the power released during an event. It should be noted that each cell overcharge/nail
puncture usually results in a violent venting event, but the result of each event affects the
cell casing slightly differently. In some cases, the burst disc fails and entire sections of the
cell burst. A review of the test plan and setup was performed, resulting in an increased
distance between the test site and researchers/visitors.

Second Test
The second attempt of this test resulted in the usual burst disc release and was a valid
evaluation of the thermal behavior of the system. Figure 66 shows that the cell was
overcharged at a constant 20 A. As a consequence, the voltage rose to 5.1 VDC just prior
to the onset of the typical dip in voltage and increase in temperature rise rate.
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Figure 66. Teflon – Overcharge Data
In this case, venting occurred when the cell surface reached 100ºC. A peak temperature of
approximately 700ºC was measured shortly after the event started. It is notable that during
this test peak temperature cooled rather quickly. Because the Teflon material didn’t burn,
there were few sustained temperature readings following the test, unlike all other results.

Figure 67. Teflon Overcharge Material Results
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Figure 67 shows the fire resulting from the overcharge event. Note that this fire only lasted
about 43 seconds. Figure 68 shows the temperatures measured by sensors mounted to
the walls of the cell enclosure made of Teflon. Note that these temperatures were only
above ambient for approximately 2 minutes. This was in contrast to all other tests where
high temperatures are typically sustained for at least 10 minutes. Only one signal reported
a temperature above 100ºC and is likely due to hot gases venting from the cell.

Figure 68. Teflon Overcharge Material Data
Figure 69 shows the results of the Teflon material after the cell and material cooled down
to ambient temperature.

Figure 69. Teflon Overcharge Material Results 2
The results of this test show that Teflon is a viable material for use as a cell separator
and even thermal barrier as it did not burn during this overcharge event. This single cell
test required little material to secure the cell during testing, but it is recommended by
the researchers that a substantially thicker stock be used to ensure that the cell remains
secure after the event. Thickness should also be carefully considered for structural integrity
in normal operation and high impact scenarios.

TEFLON – NAIL PUNCTURE
As with all other nail puncture tests, a cell was fully charged and placed in a test stand
made of the material under test. This cell then experienced a nail puncture and resulted in
an internal short leading very quickly to a venting event. Figure 70 show the data recorded
during this test.
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Figure 70. Teflon – Nail Puncture Data
The top chart shows that the cell was fully charged and resting at an open circuit voltage
of 4.2 VDC. This voltage dropped to zero once the nail punctured the cell casing,
internally shorting the cell. The middle chart shows cell surface temperatures with peaks
of approximately 420ºC and a cool-down time of almost one hour. On the bottom chart
material wall temperatures can be seen. This chart shows that except for a spike in the air
temperature inside the cell enclosure, all measurements remain below 100ºC and mimic
the cooling time of the cell.
Figure 71 shows the result of this nail puncture test. Note that the material is intact and
shows little signs of damage, only a black coating of burned electrolyte.
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Figure 71. Teflon – Nail Puncture Material Results

SINGLE CELL CONCLUSIONS
The researchers conclude that the best packaging material will depend on design scenarios
and recommend Teflon for general applications. It is worth considering the Pyrophobic
material for designs that require the absorption of energy and possibly using Teflon as a
structural and barrier material and Pyrophobic to fill the gaps and absorb energy if necessary.
In this case, definitely consider your thermal management, as there may be unintended
reactions with the intumescent thermoplastic material. See Appendix C – Tables of Test
Setup and Results for a summary of all test setups and results.

NAIL TIP TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT
To further understand the temperatures experienced inside a large-format NCA cell during
a nail puncture, a special nail was fabricated. This nail was much larger in diameter
compared to the thin nail used on all other tests. This increase in diameter allowed space
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for a thermal pile. Many temperature sensors were packed into the tip of this large nail,
and a nail penetration test was performed to capture an internal cell temperature reading
during such an event.
To this point, the only temperatures captured from the cell were actually from the casing,
which differed from internal temperatures due to the exothermic reactions.
Voltage and case temperature of the cell were also recorded in addition to values recorded
by six temperature sensors in the nail with one of them located at the very tip.

Figure 72. Nail Tip Temperature Measurement Test Setup
Figure 72 shows the test setup. Notice that the nail and the cell were lined up symmetrically
to get the best approximation of electrolyte temperature.

Min e ta National Tra n s it Re s e a rc h Co n s o rt iu m

Single-Cell Testing

67

Figure 73. Nail Tip Temperature Measurement Test Data
Figure 73 presents data gathered during this test. As has been mentioned before, six
temperature sensors were in the nail. It turns out that all of them captured the same value,
so to simplify the graph, just one signal is shown.
The top chart shows voltage recorded during this test. It also indicates when the event
started, by displaying a sharp decrease in voltage. The second chart shows cell casing
temperature; note that the readings are relatively low compared to other similar tests. The
highest temperature reached roughly 200ºC, while the others did not exceed 100ºC. One
reason for this may be that the cell had reached very low ambient temperatures beforehand.
The bottom graph showing nail tip temperature demonstrates that the temperature inside
the cell was very high in comparison to values captured on the housing, meaning that the
majority of heat was released by the evacuation of electrolyte and other solid material
through the hole made by the nail.
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Figure 74. Cell and Surroundings After Test
This larger diameter instrumented nail caused a more dramatic event relative to the smaller
nails used in previous testing. This result indicated that the severity of the puncture and
short would change the severity of the venting event. Note that in this test the steel endcap of the positive terminal broke off and was projected several feet as seen in the Figure
74. The left image shows the internal construction of the cell. Visible are the long strips
of foil rolled into a cylindrical jellyroll shape that comprise the different layers of the cell.
The same picture also shows how the nail tip broke off in the cell as the air press lifted up.
The image on the right demonstrates how savage the event was because the smoke and
flames marked the ground.
This concludes single-cell testing.
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VI. MODULE-LEVEL TESTING
This section details the design of the 20 cell modules and enclosures used in the test-tofailure scenarios. These high-voltage packs were designed with 10/20 batteries connected
in series to produce a 36/72 V nominal pack, 42/84 V fully charged. In the design of a
module, the component that held each end of the cell, called the header, was the most
critical component in the battery pack because of its structural and isolation requirements.
In addition, the headers had to allow series connections between battery terminals. These
components are necessary and must meet the high temperature demand set by the
exhausting gases if the pack is to remain intact or avoid complete vehicle fire.
SOLIDWORKS, a 3D CAD software package, was used to make mechanical designs and
to test feasibility. Later Finite Element Analysis (FEA) and Computational Fluid Dynamics
(CFD) analysis were performed on these systems.

Figure 75. Headers Designed for Module Testing
Figure 75 shows a top and bottom view of the headers. Note that on the side of the second
header, 1-inch holes were drilled through the header to pass main positive and main
negative cables and to allow for small-gauge cell voltage measurement wires. Finally, to
secure down the cover, a set of #6-32 threads were made on the outside lip of the header.
Figure 76 shows the assembled covers, headers and batteries. Two configurations of this
module were built, one with and one without cell separators.
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Figure 76. CAD of the Assembled Battery Pack

MANIFOLD DESIGN
The manifold configuration was intended for evaluating the feasibility of evacuating and
distributing heat to prevent thermal runaway propagation between cells during a cell vent.
To maximize and control the flow of electrolyte bursting out of the cells, four large openings
were integrated. These openings, located at each terminal end of the cells, would allow for
easy, low-resistance flow of the hot gases.
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Figure 77. CAD of the Manifold Design
Figure 77 shows the manifold module design. To dissipate heat and direct hot gases, steel
plates were mounted on the top and bottom of this module enclosure. The melting point
of the steel is 1510°C or roughly twice the aluminum’s, so the steel was utilized to handle
all the direct blast of the hot gases. Standoffs between the cover and steel plate created a
gap to let the gases easily flow out of the module.
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Figure 78 shows the standoff and plate configuration inside the module enclosure.
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Figure 79. CAD of the Manifold Design with Eye Bolts
Figure 79 shows the complete assembly with eyebolts. These were used as anchors to
stabilize the pack during testing.

CELL SEPARATOR DESIGN
The cell separator configuration was intended to study/prevent thermal propagation
between cells. The idea was to create a separate environment for each battery in order
to keep the heat and venting gases from the cell in their own isolated area to limit the
heat transfer to adjacent cells. The separator configuration used only 10 cells to allow
the necessary room for the separating materials. No mechanical resources were used to
secure down the separator material; it was simply sandwiched between the two headers
and secured via the threaded rods connecting the two headers together.
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Figure 80. CAD of Separator Design without Top
Figure 80 shows the CAD of the separator design.

PRESSURE RELEASE / CHECK VALVE
When one or more cells start venting in a completely closed battery pack, the copious
amount of gas released builds up pressure that could lead to an explosive scenario. To
release pressure from the enclosure, this research team chooses to incorporate a check
valve. The check valve is designed to open once a predetermined pressure is reached. A
Matlab Simulink Module was created to simulate the increment of pressure as well as the
check valve performance and to determine the proper check valve.
The pressure inside the module is based on the volume of free space inside the module and
the volume of gases emitted during the venting of at least one cell. For these calculations,
it is assumed that the internal exothermic reactions boil 100% of the electrolyte. Ideal gas
laws are assumed. From the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS), the mass of electrolyte
per cell is known. Through the gas analysis previously presented the gas composition and
percentages per volume are known. It is assumed that immediately after a cell vented, all
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the moles inside a cell were released as gas into the free space inside a module. A trigger
structure therefore had to be created in order to simulate the venting process. It is assumed
that the cell starts to vent at a tenth of a second. According to the experience gained through
the previous tests it was known that venting durations last for about 5 seconds.
Simultaneously, moles of air are being added to the moles of the cell to get the total moles
inside the enclosure. This value is then divided by the seconds that the cell is venting to
get the rate of moles/s. Later, the rate of moles/s is multiplied by the output of the switch
that will be either one if the clock is between a tenth and five seconds (because the cell
is venting) or zero when the clock is out of this range. However, the moles that are being
released by the check valve have to be subtracted to know the remaining moles in the
enclosure that build up pressure. To simulate this increment of moles along the venting
time, an integrator block is used. After the switch, the “moles_in_the_enclosure” variable is
set as an output and graphed, as is the trigger through the scope block. Figure 81 shows
the trigger and its blocks.

Figure 81. Trigger
Then the variable moles_in_the_enclosure acts as an input to the next subsystem
responsible for calculating the pressure generated for these moles using the equation of
ideal gases.
The ideal gas law is used which states:
PV=NRT
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Where:
P: Pressure (atmospheres or atm)
V: Volume (liters)
N: Number of moles (constant, no unit)
R: Gas constant (0.08205736 L·atm·mole−1·K−1)
T: Temperature (Kelvin or K)

Figure 82. Enclosure Pressure Subsystem
Figure 82 shows the pressure calculation. Based on previous tests, the temperature inside
the enclosure is assumed to be 650ºC. To get the volume, the volumes of the plastic parts
and cell have to be subtracted from the total volume of the enclosure. Then the ideal gas
law is applied to calculate the pressure that is used later as an input to simulate the check
valve operation. Figure 83 shows the subsystem accountable for replicating the check
valve operation and quantifying the flow rate.

Figure 83. Check Valve Subsystem
The check valve flow rate changes depending on whether it is under normal flow or
choked flow, which is governed by a certain value of the pressure drop ratio. Figure 84,
obtained from Forberg web site,17 shows equations to calculate each flow rate and the flow
coefficient (Cv) of each case.
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Figure 84. Flow Rate Equations
Note: P1 and P2 are in units of PSIA.

Where:
P: Absolute pressure (Absolute Pounds per Square Inch or PSIA)
T: Temperature (degrees K)
Sg: Specific gravity (unit-less)
Cv: Flow coefficient
The specific values of the gases are tabulated, and since the substances that composed
the gas as well as their percentage are known, the specific gravity can be calculated.
Given the pressure of the enclosure and the ambient pressure, the equations are
implemented such that the output provides flow rate. A switch is then imposed to determine
if the flow was normal or choked. If the pressure ratio was less than 1.89 the flow was
normal; otherwise it was choked.
Another switch checked if the pressure in the enclosure was higher than the cracking
pressure of the check valve. The cracking pressure is defined by the manufacturer and
specifies the pressure at which the check valve is going to open. In this application, a
very low cracking pressure was sought in order to start releasing the pressure as soon
as possible. This value was then sent through a gain representing the number of check
valves. This was used to model multiple check valves.
Finally, the output of this subsystem was the flow rate of the valve, which was fed back to
the trigger subsystem. The simulation was run with a valve flow coefficient of 3.53. There
are valves available with a higher Cv, but they are expensive. The results are shown below.
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Figure 85. Simulation Results
Figure 85 shows simulation results. Note that the x-axis in both charts is time in units
of seconds. The top chart shows the total number of moles released by the cell and the
bottom the pressure of the enclosure in units of psi.
At first sight, it is clear that the peaks of both signals occur at the same time. Analyzing
the value of pressure, it turns out that it is surprisingly high. According to these results, the
box won’t be able to withstand this much pressure and will end up exploding. To solve this
problem, more check valves should be mounted or the use of check valves with higher
flow rate should to be considered, or both. The check valves necessary may need to be
very large in diameter to achieve the required flow rate.
This was just a simulation, and these results had to be verified. For this reason, the actual
test was run to get real values and validate or disprove our assumptions and model.

SECURING THE MODULE
Due to the sheer amount of energy released by the whole module, it is unsafe to leave it
unsecured during a destructive test. Prior single-cell testing proved to the research team
that tie-downs to the ground were necessary to ensure the pack did not take off once cell
venting occurred. Figure 86 shows the tie-down configuration.
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Figure 86. Handle to Lift the Battery Pack up with the Forklift
The remainder of this section describes in detail the tests conducted at the module level
and displays the data that was collected during each test.

SINGLE CELL OVERCHARGE IN A MODULE WITH ACETAL HEADERS
This was the first of three module-level tests performed. The test served as practice for the
coming full-module tests and as a way to obtain information about the thermal response
of the headers, the thermal runaway propagation between cells, and the performance of
the pack design.
The test consisted of overcharging a single cell at 20 A with four bad cells on the corners of
the acetal headers. The enclosure used was the manifold design, an aluminum enclosure
with a 1/16” steel sheet mounted on the top and bottom. Openings on the side were
included to release smoke and heat produced during venting.
Voltage, current and temperatures were gathered over a CAN communication network.
The temperature sensors were distributed among the cells, headers, and covers. Below
are their locations:
• Center of cell that is being overcharged
• Enclosure ambient
• Back right center of cell closest to overcharged cell
• Top right center of cell closest to overcharged cell
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• Top right center of cell farthest away from overcharged cell
• Bottom right center of cell farthest away from overcharged cell
• Back left center of cell closest to overcharged cell
• Back left center of cell farthest away from overcharged cell
• Top left center of cell farthest away from overcharged cell
• Top left center of cell closest to overcharged cell
• Bottom header front
• Bottom header right
• Bottom header back
• Bottom header left
• Ambient
• Top cover center
• Top cover right
• Top cover back
• Top cover left
Unfortunately, the sensor on the top left center of the cell closest to the overcharged cell
got damaged and the data was irrecoverable, so this sensor was not graphed.
To analyze the entire test and not miss any detail, the data will be presented progressively,
starting with the information related to the cell that was being overcharged. The next figure
shows the current, voltage, and temperature. The test plan for this event was to charge at
a constant 20 A until the cell vented.
Figure 87 shows that the voltage increased following the same trend as the previous
tests. According to the data graph, however, the cell went off at 9.2 V. This is technically
impossible, so it means that something was wrong with the voltage sensor. Proof of that
is the increase of voltage right after the cell vented, which is technically impossible since
if the cell has vented once it is not going to vent again.
In reference to the temperature, the data show that the temperature increased as the
cell was being overcharged; it hit the thermal runaway and then vented. As usual the cell
temperature went up to about 700ºC. It then cooled down to 200ºC and then ramped back
up due to the burning acetal headers.
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Figure 87. Data – Cell Overcharge
Some completely discharged cells (dummy cells) were used to mechanically complete the
module and allow for proper alignment of the test cell relative to the module components.
Each dummy cell had a couple of temperature sensors attached to indicate if the venting
of the overcharged cell resulted in thermal propagation as well as to indicate differences
of temperatures between the sensors farthest and closest from the overcharged cell.
Instead of graphing all the sensors in the same graph, the cells will be treated individually.
Each graph in Figure 88 represents the data of one dummy cell: the temperature sensors
attached to it, the temperature of the overcharged cell, and the temperature of the ambient
cage. The second graph just contains three signals because many sensors were damaged.

Figure 88. Data Dummy Cells
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Each cell held two temperature sensors. The sensor closest to and/or in direct view of
the overcharged cell was always the first to increase. Shortly after the venting event, both
sensors of the same cell read very similar values. Eventually all four dummy cells also
vented due to the excessive heat inside the enclosure.

Figure 89. Bottom Header Temperatures
Figure 89 shows the bottom header temperature sensor readings. Analyzing the graph,
it appears each sensor suddenly increased in temperature multiple times. This likely
indicates when each dummy cell vented. It would therefore be convenient to treat each
sensor individually; sensor data is shown in Figure 90.

Figure 90. Bottom Header Temperatures (Treated Individually)
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All the sensors recorded when the overcharged cell vented with a sudden increase of
temperatures. Following the venting event one sensor cooled, then rapidly increased its
reading, whereas the other sensors only continued to increase their temperature gradually.
Then, about 2 hours and 20 minutes into the experiment, all sensors experienced another
increase in temperature, probably due to another cell venting or internal fire. Also, probably
because of proximity to the venting gases, the “bottom header left” sensor/cell shows a
relatively higher peak temperature value during the initial thermal event. This could be a sign
that the flow of hot gases/electrolyte was initially directed toward this sensor because of the
unique and somewhat unpredictable failure of the cell casing due to this overcharge event.
To try to match the sudden increase of temperature with the cells venting, the next figure
has four graphs that contain the data of each sensor of the header as well as the data of
the two closest cells. The data of the cell always correspond to the closest sensor to the
overcharged cell.

Figure 91. Bottom Header and the Closest Cell Temperatures
The data in Figure 91 does not clearly indicate when individual cells would have vented.
Again, the highest temperatures were captured by the end of the test because of the
plastic of the headers burning.
The cover is the final part left to analyze. The overcharged cell caused a rise in all the
temperature sensors to around 300-400ºC.The majority of them kept going progressively
up to around 700ºC, then shortly after started a cooling process. Nevertheless, the
sensors on the back, center and right presented different responses. The first two sensors
mentioned experienced a brutal increase of temperature right after the cell went off and
then joined the other sensors. On the other hand, the one on the right always had lower
values, although higher than the melting point of acetal (168ºC).
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Figure 92. Cover Temperatures
Note that, based on the test data and notes from this test, it is clear that the “top cover right”
sensor fell off during the test as it was much closer to ambient measurements than the
temperature of the venting gases. Once everything cooled down to ambient temperature,
the cleanup procedures started. The first surprise was that the front and back sides of the
enclosure’s Aluminum were melted as well as the sides as shown in Figure 93. The heat
of the plastic headers burning likely caused it. On the other hand, the top and bottom steel
plates successfully handled the direct impact and heat exposure of the cells venting gases.
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Figure 93. Enclosure After the Test
All cells were investigated and confirmed to have vented given that all burst discs were
opened. Inside the enclosure only metal parts remained. No plastic part remained. No
clear sign was left that the box had ever contained any plastic.

OVERCHARGE OF 20 CELLS IN STEEL ENCLOSURE
In this test, the 20 cells were connected in series to obtain a high-voltage battery pack with
a nominal voltage of 72 V. Our intention was to overcharge a single cell to avoid a really
intense event where multiple cells would begin venting simultaneously. This scenario
would be more consistent with a BMS charging failure of a single cell due to a flawed
voltage reading. It would also show the effect of thermal propagation from one failed cell
to the other cells at normal state of charge. The method chosen was to start charging at
20 A with all cells below 3.5 V except the one intended to vent, which was fully charged at
the nominal cell voltage of 3.6 V. In this way, only one cell was actually being overcharged.
The manifold design enclosure was used, the design with the openings on the side.
Adopting lessons learned from the previous single cell overcharge in a module, however,
the aluminum enclosure was replaced with one entirely made out of steel.
The headers used were made out of acetal although it was already known that they would
burn up eventually, so their function was only to hold the batteries initially.
With the amount of energy in the pack and the experience of the previous test, the event
was expected to be very intense. Test setup had to provide maximum safety for the
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researchers as well as avoid any potential hazard. The first step taken was to move the
observation and instrumentation trailer 250 feet away from the concrete test pad. The
trailer contained the chargers as well as the laptop that logged data. Data and power lines
were extended to reach the new trailer location.
In addition, the concrete pad was surrounded by three Jersey barriers to block any flying
debris, although one side facing an open field was left open for access during setup and
cleanup. The pack was tied down using the cable system explained in the section ModuleLevel Testing.
The cell voltages, temperatures and current were recorded through CAN. Two slave
modules and a BMS were needed to capture the voltages. Starting at the main negative,
the terminals of each battery were connected to the slaves. One slave measures 10 cell
voltages. Slaves are connected in an RS485 daisy chain to each other and to the BMS
main board, which provides all the cell voltages and pack voltage to the CAN network.
Several thermo-scanners were deployed, each supporting up to 40 temperature sensors
so that temperature distributions throughout the pack could be measured. All the sensors
on the first thermo-scanner were attached to a surface of a cell starting from the most
negative cell to the most positive. Sensors of the second thermo-scanner were distributed
throughout the pack and enclosure as follows:
• Bottom header left
• Bottom header back
• Bottom header right
• Bottom header front
• Top cover left
• Top cover back
• Top cover right
• Top cover front
• Top of cover on center
• Top of steel enclosure
• Front of steel enclosure
• Left of steel enclosure
• Ambient inside pack
• Ambient
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Figure 94 shows the battery pack at the start of testing, secured down and with all the
data being logged prior to initiation of charge current. The current sensor was placed at
the output of the charger in the instrumentation trailer on the power cables running out to
the pack on the test pad.

Figure 94. Battery Pack prior to Testing
Figure 95 summarizes the data of a successful test.

Figure 95. Overcharge_20_cells_steel_enclosure – Data
Figure 95 shows the voltages and the temperatures of the cells. The voltage was used to
make sure that temperatures climbed as soon as the voltages dropped. Neither graph can
support determining which cell was the first to go off or the exact moment in which each
cell vented.
Taking a look at the temperatures graph, the first surprising information is that the
temperature was between 200ºC and 700º for almost one hour and then started cooling
down over another hour.
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Nonetheless, the sensor measuring pack internal temperature reached 300ºC just as the
first cell vented; following this event it cooled down to ambient temperatures. This behavior
is very odd, as the venting cells were releasing a lot of heat. Hence the intensity of the
event: the smoke or flames most likely kicked the sensor out of the pack, and the sensor
then started reading internal pack temperatures.
At the same time, the heat was also affecting the plastic parts of the battery pack. Figure
96 presents the data of the sensors spread on the bottom header. Of course, each plastic
part of the pack caught fire and burned until it was gone.
Analyzing the data available, one sees that at first a couple of sensors went up to 1200ºC.
That must be a consequence of multiple cells going off at the same exact moment. The
other cells went up to more familiar values between 600ºC and 800ºC. After those peaks,
the sensors registered very different values, and none of them followed the same trend.
Some of them took more time to cool down, while some of them took less.

Figure 96. Bottom Header Temperatures
The covers, (see Figure 97 below) also reached 1200ºC, although the location did not
match with the one on the header. The extreme heat damaged the sensor on the right and
the one in the center. Of course, the covers also burned down.
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Figure 97. Cover Temperatures
Accordingly, as the next image shows, the metal parts for the enclosure, instead of getting to
as high a temperature as the cover and headers, reached around 1000ºC. Remember that
the enclosure was made out of steel, and its melting point was higher than the temperature
captured by the sensors. Therefore, the enclosure should not present any signs of melting
or any holes caused by the flames of the cell. Notice also that it cooled down so quickly
because it was the outside layer of the pack, the one that received less heat and was in
contact directly with the ambient temperature.

Figure 98. Steel Temperatures
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After a reasonable time to let everything cool down, the pack was analyzed. The metal
enclosure passed the test very successfully as it did not get melted anywhere. The only
noticeable sign that it had been exposed to high temperatures was that each side bent a
little and the steel got a different tonality.
Again, as expected according to the previous tests, the plastic parts did not make it and
burned up.
All the cells, moreover, had their vents opened, meaning that all of them vented. Their
voltages were analyzed and were null.
Figure 99 is a screen shot of video recorded during the event. The picture demonstrates the
brutality of the flames coming out of the openings of the pack. It would not be unreasonable
to think that some batteries vented at the same time due to the effect of the thermal
runaway propagation.

Figure 99. Battery Pack Venting
The thermal propagation was also palpable, however, because multiple times, right after
one cell had finish venting, another one started venting right away. The event is shown and
explained through the next sequence of images in Figure 100.

Figure 100. Sequence of the Venting Process
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On the top left of each picture is the exact second the image was taken counting from the
first cell that vented. As has been mentioned before, the thermal propagation appeared
several times and actually happened before the 30th second, but the shots were not as
clear as these ones.
The first picture of the sequence shows the venting of at least one cell. It also shows how
flames exit the openings. Venting occurred in the second picture as well; flames kept
coming out because plastic parts were still burning, and cells were not venting at this point.
The fire and high temperature forced another cell to vent as is shown in the last picture of
the sequence.
The venting of the 20 cells lasted about one-and-half minutes, after which the pack kept
burning for six more minutes.
Though it is not appreciable from the images, a huge dark cloud of smoke was generated.
It was assumed to be very toxic, highlighting the importance of treating the smoke as a
potential hazard as well as the necessity of evacuating it rapidly to keep it away from
human beings.
The steel enclosure did a great job; it could handle those extreme temperatures without
any problems. It did not melt and could be even reused for another test. Figure 101 shows
the resulting steel module enclosure.
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Figure 101. Resulting Steel Module Enclosure
Our approach was to test a one-cell overcharge in a module (with no other active cells
and current passing through only one cell), then a full module overcharge (with current
through all 20 cells at a relatively close state of charge). These tests are presented above.
The research team overcharged a single cell in a module and 20 cells in a module. Given
the nature of battery systems and the fact that they are never completely equal in state
of charge and/or voltage, however, it is nearly impossible to have all cells reach the point
of venting at the same time. What is more usual is what happened in this test. One cell
reached a venting stage first and the additional heat released by this venting cell caused
the other cells to vent. This all happened in a few seconds, so if they were all to vent due
to an overcharge or to excessive heat released from a venting cell the result would the
same: all cells venting in a few seconds, as is shown in the test results.
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CHECK VALVE TEST
A sealed pack of 20 cells with only a check valve opening was overcharged at 20 A to
determine the feasibility of controlling an enclosure venting event. A pressure sensor was
also installed on this battery pack to support verification of previous modeling efforts and
better understand the rise in pressure due to cell venting. For this setup a single module
was installed into a sealed battery pack enclosure to replicate a full battery system.
Twenty cells were connected in series to obtain a high-voltage pack with a nominal voltage
of 72 VDC. It is important to note that one of these cells was initially charged to a relatively
higher SOC. This configuration was built to allow for the entire pack to experience an
overcharge with the expectation that the high-SOC cell would be the first to vent and do so
well before the other cells in the pack. The goal was to allow enough time to understand a
single-cell event before the remaining cells vented.
Both the internal module and pack enclosure were made of low-carbon steel to ensure the
longest possible test time and avoid holes burning and breaking the pack seal prematurely.
All air gaps were sealed prior to testing. The check valve device was threaded to the lid
through a weld-in-bung. Meanwhile the other end was threaded to a tube that worked as
an exhaust manifold for venting cell gasses.
A relatively high flow rate check valve was selected based on simulation results.
The check valve did work, but unfortunately just for a short time. An increase in pressure
built up, causing the lid to open. Also, the exhaust manifold including check valve broke
free due to excessive vibration and force.
Results from this test were very interesting. First of all, it was quite remarkable that just
one cell vented and there wasn’t enough thermal propagation to cause runaway in any
other cells. In fact, during the cleaning up process each voltage was measured and except
for the cell that went off, the other ones held the SOC they had been charged to prior to a
cell venting.
Flames produced during venting did not ignite the packaging material. Only the area
immediately surrounding the cell that vented showed damage. The steel enclosure that
surrounded the module did not experience any damage, and (besides the lid) neither did
the external enclosure.
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VII. CRASH TESTING
In contrast to the many standardized battery impact tests found in the literature, this
pendulum-based crash test was designed to simulate the specific and common scenario
of a light vehicle impacting the side of a transit bus, including the worst-case scenario of
the vehicle impacting directly at the point where a battery pack was mounted outside the
bus frame rail. The intention was to include realistic vehicle speeds, vehicle mass, bumper
dimensions, and dynamics of bus chassis and tires as will be seen later in the section. LTI
regularly performs full-scale crash tests of this type, but the cost of such a full-scale test
was beyond the scope of this project. A pendulum impact serves as a close approximation.
The impact test required significant preparation, as everything had to go perfectly on the
first try. The tasks were split up as follows: preparation of the truck to simulate a bus,
preparation of the battery pack, and preparation of the test.

PREPARATION FOR THE TRUCK
To simulate a small to medium transit bus, an 18,400-lb. Gross Vehicle Weight Rating
(GVWR) refrigerated box truck was selected from an inventory of available crash trucks at
our test track. The particular truck shown in Figure 103 was used for on-campus delivery
by the Penn State Creamery and was not in running condition, a fact that would not affect
the goal of replicating the dynamics of the vehicle during an impact.

Figure 102. 18,400-lbs. GVWR Refrigerated Truck to Simulate Bus
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The box was removed from the truck for safety reasons, because if the batteries burned
the bed could also catch on fire. In addition, current buses do not use similar insulated
materials for their side panels, so it was incompatible to test it. Using a torch, the box was
cut off and lifted by two forklifts. The truck was then pulled from underneath the box. All
liquids were removed, the tires were filled up with air, and the exhaust was cut off.
The bare truck chassis weighed in at 12,250 lbs. Several options were considered to add
weight; the final choice was to mount two Jersey barriers at 4,750 lbs. each mounted on I
beam sections welded to the frame as shown in Figure 104 and Figure 105. Heavy ratchet
straps secured the Jersey barriers.

Figure 103. I Beam Sections Welded to Chassis Frame
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Figure 104. Jersey Barriers Mounted onto Truck Chassis
At this point the truck weighed 17,750 lbs. After taking into account that the weight of the
battery pack would be 100 lbs., an extra 550 lbs. of sand bags were distributed throughout
the back of the truck until the GVWR of 18,400 lbs. was achieved. The truck was then
moved to the pendulum test pad and was placed at the impact point.

PENDULUM
The College’s track facilities include a 40-ft. tall impact pendulum tower and test pad. In
this case, the impact mass would simulate an SUV crashing into the side of a transit bus.
The empty impact pendulum weighed 1200 lbs. Because a typical SUV weighs between
3500 and 4500 lb., the pendulum was loaded with all twenty-eight available steel plates,
each weighing 100 lbs., achieving a total mass of 4000 lbs.
A front bumper for a 2006 Suburban was shortened to avoid a collision with the truck cab
and back wheels. It was attached to the impact mass with steel tubes of similar proportions
to the original Suburban frame. Figure 106 shows that both square tubes were welded to
a c-channel base, and extra tabs were added to support the bumper from the main square
frame tube in a manner similar to the vehicle design.
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Figure 105. Left, Top View of Bumper, Right Bottom View
The bumper was mounted on the impact mass and the truck aligned for direct impact on
the battery module as shown in Figure 107.

Figure 106. Impact Mass Mounted Bumper and Battery Position

FREE SWING TEST
Goals of the free swing test were to insure the pendulum would impact the battery pack
at a right angle, accurately, and at the desired velocity. Exact location of the truck tires
was marked on the test pad with spray paint, and the truck was then moved off the test
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pad. Radar was set up to measure impact mass velocity. The radar is composed of two
components: a laptop with software that monitors the velocity and the sensor to measure
velocity of the moving mass.
To determine exactly where the pendulum would impact the battery module, a sponge
filled with yellow paint was attached to the bumper. A white cardboard target of the same
dimensions as the battery pack was placed on the spot and height where the battery pack
would be mounted on the truck, as shown in Figure 108. Additional targets were placed in
the positions of the truck cab and wheels to insure pendulum clearances.

Figure 107. Pendulum Test Swing Setup
The final setup step was to attach a measuring tape to the bottom of the impact mass to
determine static height and lifted height above the ground. The static height was found to be
26 inches. The lifted height for a target impact speed can be determined through equating
the potential and kinetic energy equations. Three free swings were performed, lowest speed
first, to test the releasing system and accuracy of pendulum swing. The pendulum was
pulled up to a lifted height of 11.36 ft. and a velocity of 18.5 mph was measured as validated
by the following energy equations which predict a speed of 18.44 mph.
Pendulum weight = 4000 lbs. = mg
Gravity g = 32.2 ft./s2
Pendulum mass = 4000 lbs. / 32.2 ft./s2 = 124.22 lb-s2/ft.
Potential Energy = mgh= 4000 lbs. * 11.36 ft. = 45,453.3 lb. ft.
Kinetic Energy = mv2/2 = PE
v = (2*PE/m)1/2 = (2 * 45,453.3 / 124.22)1/2 = 27.05 ft./s = 18.44 mph
As a second test, the impact mass was raised to the maximum practical total height (limited
by lift cable tension) of 21 feet and 1 inch, and velocity measured was 25.0 mph. A third try
validated that the velocity at 21 feet and 1 inch was again 25.0 mph. This speed is typical
of vehicles impacting the side of buses in urban environments, especially at intersections.
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The last free swing was also used to validate the accuracy of bumper impact location
relative to the battery box position. In Figure 109, the yellow paint mark indicates that the
bumper impacted the battery position (simulated by the gray tape) within two inches of the
original alignment. The fact that the pendulum impacted lower than the static alignment is
likely due to cable stretching under additional dynamic loading from swing velocity.

Figure 108. Impact Accuracy of Pendulum to Battery Position

BATTERY PACK PREPARATION
The intention of this test was to simulate a full-sized bus battery pack, but space limitations
on the frame of the truck restricted the test to a single module with 20 cells. After making
sure that all BMS and temperature data was logging properly, the investigators inserted
the pack into a steel box that was subsequently housed within an external aluminum
enclosure as shown in Figure 110. The aluminum enclosure was designed with flanges for
mounting to the truck frame between the cab and rear wheels. A power connector was also
attached to the pack to simulate a real pack as closely as possible.
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Figure 109. Aluminum Enclosure with Frame Mounting Flanges
Figure 111 shows the battery module mounted to the truck frame between the cab and rear
wheels. A thermocouple scanner was mounted to the truck frame, and a data acquisition
box was placed on the ground as far away as cabling allowed.
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Figure 110. Battery Module Mounted on Frame with Data Acquisition
Figure 112 shows the positions of video and high-speed cameras placed to capture the
crash event. The orange cone atop the pack is intended to serve as an inertial reference
in the high-speed video. The pendulum can be seen suspended a few feet away from the
battery module prior to lifting.
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Figure 111. Camera Layout

IMPACT TEST RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Test setup included camera placement and extension of the pendulum release tether to
200 feet. Local fire departments were invited to observe the test. The area was cleared
of all personnel except one observer and the tow truck driver. The pendulum was pulled
up to the 25 mph lifted height of 18.92 ft. Finally, the cameras were triggered, and the
area was cleared of all personnel to a radius of 200 feet. A horn blast was given and the
release mechanism was triggered to drop the pendulum. The pendulum impacted the
box and truck, which was pushed back about one foot. No venting of cells was detected
upon impact. As shown in Figure 113, local firefighters drilled on approaching the pack
in full personal protective equipment (PPE) ready to apply water coolant, as would be
their practice in response to an actual traffic accident involving an electrified transit bus.
They also deployed an infrared camera to remotely detect hot spots on the pack, an
indication of thermal runaway. No excessive heat was detected. Afterwards, the pack was
left undisturbed for at least 24 hours.
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Figure 112. Fire Fighters Approach Battery Pack after Impact
The BMS collected voltage and temperature data on all 20 cells within the module during
the simulated crash test in anticipation of venting and thermal events. Since no venting
occurred, the voltage data was unchanged, and only small perturbations in temperature
occurred due to ambient conditions as shown in Figure 114. A slight temperature rise of
3ºC was detected on all cells at the time of impact. This was probably due to mechanical
energy and frictional work dissipated within the pack during the impact event. Cell 5 also
demonstrated sensor bias and scaling which was unrelated to the crash event.
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Figure 113. Individual Cell Temperatures during Simulated Crash Event
Upon inspection, it was noted that the center section of bumper deformed until the
simulated SUV frame impacted the truck frame on either side of the battery module. The
battery enclosure was significantly dented but not totally crushed, as shown in Figure 115.
Some truck frame deformation was detected. The impact momentum transferred to the
truck moved the front axle back 13 inches and the rear axle back 11 inches. Almost all the
energy was transformed into deformation of the bumper and into movement of the truck.

Figure 114. Deformation of Bumper and Module Enclosure
Upon disassembly of the battery pack, it was observed that none of the battery cells were
severely crushed or penetrated by any part of the pendulum. In this case, all four cells
on the impact side of the pack showed some abrasion and slight denting on the outside
casings, as shown in Figure 116. This impact represents a best-case scenario, however,
with the bumper and vehicle dynamics absorbing much of the energy. This would not have
been the case if a more rigid component of the impacting vehicle, such as the frame, had
penetrated the pack. Here no thermal runaway occurred within 48 hours before disposal.
These dents are severe enough, however, to have potentially resulted in either immediate
or eventual internal shorting leading to thermal runaway. Delayed thermal runaway has
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occurred in some high-profile cases. Individual cells retained their full voltage output. All
cells from this pack were placed in a saltwater bath to safely discharge prior to disposal.

Figure 115. Dented Battery Cell
This test demonstrated that the simulated shock of a 25 mph SUV collision directly into a
battery module mounted outside a bus frame might not necessarily result in a venting event.
In this case, the bumper absorbed much of the energy by deformation, a significant energy
portion was transferred into vehicle momentum, and the battery pack was not penetrated
by any rigid vehicle components. The dual-wall steel-aluminum enclosure and header also
provided substantial strength and protection against crushing. A different outcome would
have been expected, however, if the collision had included battery pack penetration.
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VIII. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
In the case where NCA batteries onboard a bus vent, it is important to understand the
gases released, which may present an exposure risk to bus passengers and bystanders.
A study of the gases venting from a cell is analyzed in this report, though it does not cover
the gases generated from any of the selected packaging materials. Figure 4 showed the
types and amounts of gases released during venting, most of which were common carbon
oxides and hydrocarbons including methane (CH4), methylene (CH2), ethane (C2H6),
propane (C3H8), butane (C4H10), hydrogen (H2), and higher hydrocarbons C3 and C5. A
validation test of gases released was run during one of our cell nail puncture tests. Sample
gases were collected near the event through a tube leading to a gas collection bag.
The gas sample bag was processed at a Penn State laboratory using a GC-17A gas
chromatograph manufactured by Shimadzu. The method used Flame Ionization Detection
(FID), which is only effective at detecting hydrocarbons. The results are shown in Figure 118.
Peaks were detected for several hydrocarbons including CH4, CH2, C2H6, C3H8, and C4H10.
These gases (with the exception of CH2) were also present in the more comprehensive gas
analysis depicted previously and presented here again in Figure 119 with the commonly
detected gases highlighted.

Figure 116. Gas Chromatography Results
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Figure 117. Molecules Present in Venting Gas
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IX. CONCLUSION
When considering the use of an NCA battery system in a transit bus application, material
and structural design is critical to keeping passengers safe. Common plastics such
as acetal and PET have acceptable structural properties, but their swift and sustained
combustibility under the high temperatures of a nearby thermal event poses a risk of rapid
and severe events. Teflon is an affordable material and works well as a cell radiant heat
separator because its melting point is high enough to withstand the heat generated by the
large-format cells used in this testing. Pyrophobic phase-change material also performed
well in our single-cell testing. Aluminum enclosures cannot withstand the temperatures of
venting or sustained battery fires. Steel performs very well and can also provide additional
strength to resist crush and puncture.
The research team found that the greatest safety concern when using such a high-energy
chemistry is ensuring passenger safety when a cell’s electrolyte boils and causes the
ventilation of high-temperature toxic material. A cell-venting event can be triggered by
a variety of scenarios with differing levels of likelihood. Though no system is perfect,
a properly functioning and intelligent battery management system with voltage and
temperature measurement should be able to avoid loading cells beyond their limits. As
shown in this report, however, just one volt beyond the limit or a one-volt error can cause
an overcharge event. Redundant voltage measurement is recommended and should be
considered a high-risk, mandatory validation performed often by the battery management
system. More noteworthy are the external temperature measurement results. Depending
on how well a battery management system can track temperature or a model’s internal
temperature, a cell could vent before an external temperature sensor reads a value
outside the nominal limitations. In conclusion, redundant voltage measurement and realtime internal temperature modeling or a virtual sensor should be mandatory to avoid cellventing events.
Most interestingly, the team discovered that following a venting event the largeformat cells tested immediately reached and remained at extremely high external skin
temperatures for very long periods. If an event happens, it must be understood that
danger can still be present for hours after the venting event. A fire may take place hours
after the battery vents. Even worse, other cells can be heated and caused to vent due
to the heat produced by the initial vented cell. Cooling is very important in crash/incident
recovery and system design.
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APPENDIX B – FMVSS STANDARDS
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Appendix B – FMVSS Standards
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APPENDIX C – TABLES OF TEST SETUP AND RESULTS
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Appendix C – Tables of Test Setup and Results
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NAIL TIP TEMPERATRUE MEASUREMENT
Nail Puncture
1
- Positive terminal
- Negative terminal
- Top of the cell by positive terminal
- Top of the cell by negative terminal
Cell stand
Metal Bands
Temperature - Top of the cell by center of the cell
sensors
- Inside the nail
location - Inside the nail
Voltage
Data aquisition
Temperature
- Inside the nail
- Inside the nail
Voltage: Single board A/D
- Inside the nail
Equipment Temperature sensors: Thermocouple K type
- Inside the nail
- Ambient
Type of test
Nº of cells
Material

Type of test
Total nº of cells
Nº of cells overcharged
Pack made out of
Module Enclosure
Charged at
Data aquisition

Equipment

SINGLE CELL OVERCHARGE IN A MODULE WITH ACETAL HEADERS
Overcharge
- Center of cell that is being overcharged
5
- Ambient inside the enclosure
1
- Back right center of cell closest to
Acetal
- Top right center of cell closest to
Aluminum with steel plates. Enclosure with
- Top right center of cell farthest away
Temperature - Bottom right center of cell farthest away
openings
sensors
20 A
- Back left center of cell closest to
location - Back left center of cell farthest away
Voltage
Temperature
- Top left center of cell farthest away from
Current
- Top left center of cell closest to
Voltage: Single board A/D
- Bottom header front
Temperature sensors: Thermocouple J type
- Bottom header right
Current: LEM CAB300
- Bottom header back

Type of test
Total nº of cells
Nº of cells overcharged
Pack made out of
Module Enclosure
Charged at
Data aquisition

Equipment

- Bottom header left
- Ambient
- Top cover center
- Top cover right
- Top cover back
- Top cover left

OVERCHARGE OF 20 CELLS IN STEEL ENCLOSURE
Overcharge
- Bottom header left
- Ambient
20
- Bottom header back
20
- Bottom header right
Acetal
- Bottom header front
- Top cover left
Steel. Enclosure with openings
Temperature - Top cover back
sensors
20 A
- Top cover right
location - Top cover front
Voltage
Temperature
- Top of cover on center
Current
- Top steel enclsoure
Voltage: Production Batter Management
- Front of steel enclosure
Temperature sensors: Thermocouple J type
- Left of steel enclosure
Current: LEM CAB 300
- Ambient inside pack
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Type of test
Total nº of cells
Nº of cells overcharged
Pack made out of
Module Enclosure
Pack Enclosure
Charged at
Data aquisition

Equipment

Type of test
Total nº of cells
Nº of cells crashed
Pack made out of
Module Enclosure
Pack Enclosure
Data aquisition

Equipment

CHECK VALVE TEST
Overcharge
20
20
Acetal
Steel. Enclosure with openings
Aluminum. Closed Enclosure
20 A
Voltage
Temperature
Current
Pressure
Voltage: Single board A/D
Temperature sensors: Thermocouple J type
Current: LEM CAB 300
Pressure sensor: Honeywell MLH150PGB06A
CRASH TESTING
Crash
20
20
Acetal
Steel. Enclosure with openings
Temperature
Aluminum. Closed enclosure
sensors
Voltage
location
Temperature

Voltage: Production Battery Management
Temperature sensors: Thermocouple J type
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- Bottom header left
- Bottom header back
- Bottom header right
- Bottom header front
- Top cover left
- Top cover back
Temperature - Top cover right
sensors
- Top cover front
location - Top of cover on center
- Top steel enclsoure
- Front of steel enclosure
- Left of steel enclosure
- Ambient inside pack
- Ambient

- Cell 1
- Cell 2
- Cell 3
- Cell 4
- Cell 5
- Cell 6
- Cell 7
- Cell 8
- Cell 9
- Cell 10
- Cell 11
- Cell 12
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- Cell 13
-Cell 14
- Cell 15
- Cell 16
- Cell 17
- Cell 18
- Cell 19

Pastic parts made out of
Parts made of plastic
Module Housing Material
Enclosure Housing Material
Test

- Positive terminal
- Negative terminal
- Top of the cell by positive terminal
- Top of the cell by negative terminal
- Top of the cell by center of the cell
- Aluminum sheet by positive terminal
- Steel sheet by negative terminal
- Base
- Outside wall by positive terminal
- Outside wall by negative terminal
- Top Wall
- Front Wall
- Between Pyrophobic cage and Aluminum Housing
- Cage Ambient
- Top Housing
- Nail Temperature

Cage & Base

PET

PTFE(Teflon)

No plastic
None

Aluminum
Overcharge

Nail Puncture

Acetal-Overcharge Acetal-Nail Puncture

Temperatures
Temperatures
sensors used were sensors used were
not capable of
not capable of
capturing the
capturing the
highest
highest
temperatures of the temperatures of the
test.
test.

Overcharge and
Material Test

Overcharge

Nail Puncture

Acetal-Overcharge
and Material Test

Pyrophobic
Overcharge

Pyrophobic Nail
Puncture

685.47
685.59
603.53
644.13
649.97
745.94
577.09
347.97

369.13
316.13
740.41
227.16
269.81

544.91
296.09
275.41
403.09

101.66
133.50
163.03
75.25

19.97
59.41
162.84
129.34

Overcharge w/
metal Housing
Pyrophobic
Overcharge w/
metal Housing
429.00
512.03
440.25
486.38
566.13

525.72
305.03
540.72
406.28
29.97
555.19
129.88

Overcharge
PET - Overcharge

Nail Puncture

Overcharge

Nail Puncture

PET- Nail Puncture PTFE - Overcharge PTFE- Nail Puncture

582.88
747.19
Got Damaged
750.69
730.00

603.72
641.44
553.44
711.03
630.84

293.16
748.56
604.75
342.41
361.31

414.97
343.28
422.94
361.75
386.81

378.53

116.09
620.69

667.47
748.47
717.44
Got Damaged

52.03
Got damaged

698.38
572.03

265.84

741.41

665.22

Nail Tip
Temperatrue
Nail Tip
Temperatrue
Measurement
37.59
97.09
70.06
188.84
86.25

102.28
437.31
602.19
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Max Temperatures ºC

Name

Single Cell Test Results
Pyrophobic

Acetal
Base
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Module Tests Results
Pack Module Level
Acetal
Battery pack: headers, covers
Aluminum
Steel
Steel
Aluminum

Pastic parts made out of
Parts made of plastic
Module Housing Material
Enclosure Housing Material
Test

Overcharge
Single Cell Overcharge in a
module with Acetal headers

Max Temperatures ºC

Name
- Center of cell that is being overcharged
- Top right center of cell closest to overcharged cell
- Top right center of cell farthest away from overcharged cell
- Bottom right center of cell closest to overcharged cell
- Bottom right center of cell farthest away from overcharged cell
- Bottom left center of cell closest to overcharged cell
- Bottom left center of cell farthest away from overcharged cell
- Top left center of cell farthest away from overcharged cell
- Top left center of cell closest to overcharged cell
Cell 2
Cell 3
Cell 4
Cell 6
Cell 7
Cell 8
Cell 9
Cell 10
Cell 11
Cell 13
Cell 14
Cell 16
Cell 17
Cell 18
Cell 20
- Ambient inside the enclosure
- Bottom header front
- Bottom header right
- Bottom header back
- Bottom header left
- Top cover center
- Top cover right
- Top cover back
- Top cover left
- Top cover front
- Top of steel enclosure
- Front of steel enclosure
- Left of steel enclosure

Cell 12
Cell 1
Cell 19
Cell 15
Cell 5

750.34
604.28
750.94
598.66
612.44
683.91
750.97
646.72
279.78

731.81
731.81
604.28
612.44
750.97
750.97
682.22
748.22
750.53
750.56

Overcharge of
20 cells in
Check Valve Test
steel
enclosure
67.91

Steel
Aluminum
Crash Testing

Crash Testing
Damaged

750.94

34.66

739.78

33.91

749.78

34.19

561.25

27.59

710.91
749.91
750.91
750.78
750.72
750.63
750.72
750.09
749.25
750.06
750.56
76.44
745.22
749.34
750.69
815.91
826.60
1140.35
1200.85
775.91
1117.48
839.48
925.04
1200.85
842.91
855.23
938.73
979.91

37.31
36.34
35.41
35.31
34.63
34.66
33.34
34.19
33.78
33.88
34.13
Damaged
33.94
33.72
34.13
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A/Ah
AC
APTA
atm
BATTERY
BMS
BRTC
C
CAD
CAN
CFD
CH2
CH4
C2H6
C3H8
C4H10
CNC
C Rate
DC
DFMEA
DOT
DP
DST
ECE
EIS
EOL
ESR
ESS
EV
FEA
FMVSS
FID
FMVSS
GVWR
HEV
HLDI
H2
Hz

Ampere/Ampere-Hour
Alternating Current
American Public Transit Association
Atmospheres
Battery Application Technology Testing and Energy
Research Laboratory
Battery Management System
Bus Research and Testing Center
Centigrade
Computer Aided Design
Controller Area Network
Computational Fluid Dynamics
methylene
methane
ethane
propane
butane
Computer Numerical Control
Battery Hourly Power Rate
Direct Current
Design Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Department of transportation
Dual Polarization
Dynamic Stress Test
Economic Commission for Europe
Electrochemical Impedance Spectroscopy
End of Life
Effective Series Resistance
Energy Storage System
Electric Vehicle
Finite Element Analysis
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
Flame Ionization Detection
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
Gross Vehicle Weight Rating
Hybrid Electric Vehicles
Highway Loss Data Institute
hydrogen
Hertz, a unit of frequency
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
IIHS
K
kW/kWh
LFP
LTI
LTO
MNTRC
mph
MSDS
mV
NCA
NCAP
NFPA
NHTSA
OCV
PET
POM
PCB
PPE
PTFE
PHEV
PSIA
RTD
RC
SAE
SBC
SBPG
SOC
SUV
UNECE
TIG
VAC
V
VAC
VDC

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
Kelvin
kilowatt/kilowatt-hour
Lithium Ion Phosphate
Thomas D. Larson Pennsylvania Transportation Institute
Lithium Titanate Oxide
Mineta National Transit Research Consortium
Miles Per Hour
Material Safety Data Sheet
Microvolt
Lithium Nickel Cobalt Aluminum Oxide
New Car Assessment Program
National Fire Protective Association
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Open Circuit Voltage
Polyethylene Terephthalate
Polyoxymethylene (commercially known as acetal)
Printed Circuit Board
Personal Protective Equipment
Polytetrafluoroethylene (commercially known as Teflon)
Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicle
Absolute Pounds Per Square Inch (Absolute Pressure)
Resistance Temperature Detectors
Resistor-Capacitor
Society of Automotive Engineers
Single Board Computer
Standard Bus Procurement Guidelines
State of Charge
Sport Utility Vehicle
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
Tungsten Inert Gas
Variable Alternating Current
Volt
Volts Alternating Current
Volts Direct Current
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